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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores and evaluates the application of the lean enterprise concept to the
expansion and development of the high speed railway industry in Japan. The basic idea of
the lean enterprise is increasing value-added processes, eliminating waste, and creating
equitable value delivery throughout the enterprise. It also focuses on both radical change
and continuous improvement. The application of the lean enterprise concept to the railway
industry, a service industry, is the first such example. Therefore, the aim is not only to
consider the future strategy of the new high speed rail in Japan, but also to assess whether
lean enterprise architecting is applicable to the new construction projects of railway
industry.
First, this thesis looks back at the history of the Japanese railway system and examines the
details of the present Shinkansen railway system. It then makes an international comparison
with the United Kingdom and German railway systems to be utilized it in the later analysis.
Next, the Enterprise Value Stream Mapping and Analysis (EVSMA) is applied to the new
extended Shinkansen projects in Japan, providing suggestions that for strategy that can
offer the projects some advantages from the lean enterprise perspective.
The results suggest that the lean enterprise concept is very suitable for the development of
railway industries to enhance the total enterprise performance, because of the need for large
capital investment and its complexity and high technology. Some barriers exist, such as
political interventions, but if the lean approach is applied by the representatives of existing
stakeholders, it will greatly help the slow growth Japanese railway industry to prosper.
The lean enterprise concept is further tested and validated through application to Portugal's
high speed rail construction project. An appropriate strategy for construction of high speed
rail, derived from this analysis, generates some useful ideas for the future.
Thesis Supervisor: Joseph M. Sussman
Title: Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering and Engineering Systems
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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1. Background and Outline
The high speed rail industry is evolving in the world. Recently high speed rail in Taiwan
introduced the Japanese technology there, and China is now choosing the technology
among Japan, Germany and France [1]. In Europe, there are some extension projects in
Germany, Spain and France.
In Japan which was the first country to have high speed rail, the technology for
improvement in speed is developing and extensions of high speed rail (Shinkansen') are
continuing. Considering the small size of the country and relatively big share of railways
among modes in Japan (Figure 1-1, Figure 1-2), it is not an exaggeration to say that the
Japanese Railway Industry is still in a favorable situation to have further extension of
Shinkansen lines.
E0 Railway 0 Road 0 Air 0 Ship
France
Germany
UK
Japan
0 1000 2000 3000 4000
[ million passenger-km]
Source: JR East [2]
Figure 1-1 Passenger Transportation by mode
The Japanese term for high speed rail is "Shinkansen", literally "New Trunk Lines", on which
maximum speed in operation is 275 km/h and average speed is more than 200 km/h.
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Source: Statistics Bureau & Statistical Research and Training Institute [3]
Figure 1-2 Area of each country
Although huge capital investment is necessary, the Shinkansen is capable of providing high
volume, efficient and precisely scheduled transportation and is good for the environment.
Also if the construction plan is successful, there is a huge impact on the local economy.
However, with the decline in population and trends toward greater use of the road
transportation mode, a careful decision making process is necessary for extension projects.
Additionally, the system of the new extended Shinkansen lines is not vertically integrated.
Operations are separated from infrastructure, which is different from the vertically
integrated system of the existing lines. In the system of newly extended Shinkansen lines,
infrastructure is owned by governmental organizations and there is a lease contract between
the government and operators. This new type of railway system organization is more like
that of European countries such as Germany and the U.K. This thesis compares them
internationally to assess the organization of the new extended Shinkansen lines in Japan
and to utilize the assessment in the later analysis.
Then this thesis explores and evaluates the Shinkansen expansion and development in the
JR East2 area in Japan. Because of the need for large capital investment and its complexity
and high technology, it is necessary to enhance the total enterprise performance in ways
2 JR East : East Japan Railway Company, one of the six biggest railway companies in Japan. The
area is in the eastern part of Honshu, the main island, and includes the Tokyo area.
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similar to the LAI project3 (Refer to Chapter 5). This thesis will apply the ideas of LAI to
Japanese railway industry, especially in the JR East area, and suggest a new lean enterprise
(Refer to Chapter 5 and 6) [4] for the further development of Japanese high speed railways.
Since this application of the lean enterprise concept toward railway is the first time, this
thesis will assess the usefulness of lean enterprise concept for the development of high
speed rail. Finally, as another example of applying the lean enterprise concept, Portugal's
case study is discussed.
1.2. Research Objectives
This thesis aims to accomplish five steps: (1) Look back to the Japanese railway system in
history and examine the details of the present Shinkansen railway system (2) compare with
the United Kingdom and German railway systems to utilize it in the later analysis, (3)
apply the Enterprise Value Stream Mapping and Analysis, EVSMA [5], (Refer to Chapter 5
and 6) to the new extended Shinkansen projects in Japan, (4) provide suggestions for
strategy of Japanese Shinkansen extension projects to become a lean enterprise, (5)assess
whether the new lean enterprise architecting concept is applicable to the development of
high speed railway industry, (6)propose an appropriate approach toward the construction of
high speed rail in Portugal.
The main part of this thesis is the application of lean enterprise concept for new high speed
railway in Japan. Lean enterprise concept is usually used for manufacturing companies and
now beginning to be used in the aerospace industry in the U.S. The focus of the study is
expanding but the application toward the railway industry is the first trial. Therefore, it is
not only to suggest the future strategy of high speed rail industry in Japan, but also to
assess whether lean enterprise architecting is applicable to new high speed rail projects.
3 LAI : Lean Aerospace Initiative, a consortium dedicated to enterprise performance of aerospace
industry in the U.S. [4]
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1.3. Thesis Structure
Chapter 1 provides general information on Japanese high speed railway industry and a
small introduction of lean enterprise concept. Chapter 1 also identifies the purpose and
structure of this thesis.
Chapter 2 starts with describing recent history of Japan's nationwide railway network and
its system through the break up of the Japanese National Railways in 1987.
Chapter 3 provides basic information on the several types of Shinkansen lines in Japan.
This includes existing lines built to full Shinkansen standards, extensions on which
smaller-profile cars are used, and new extended Shinkansen lines, some of which are still
under construction or planning. It also describes the relationship with the Japanese
government.
Chapter 4 discusses case studies of the United Kingdom and Germany, and compares them
with the new Japanese extended Shinkansen industry in system terms, to utilize them in
later analysis.
Chapter 5 introduces general information on lean enterprise architecting and EVSMA
(Enterprise Value Stream Mapping and Analysis) that is used at MIT [5] and LAI.
Based on Chapter 2 through 5, Chapter 6 emphasizes and utilizes the lean enterprise
architecting concept and EVSMA as a tool for developing the new extension of Shinkansen
lines in Japan efficiently. It is strongly focused on the new Shinkansen extension projects in
Japan. Finally Chapter 6 also identifies how the ideas work for the railway industry in
general, based on the analysis in this chapter. This is the first application of the lean
enterprise concepts to the railway industry; they have already been applied to the aerospace
industry in the U.S.
Chapter 7 also suggests how one would design a lean enterprise for high speed rail in
Portugal by putting together about some facts about Portugal, case studies of European
17
countries and lean enterprise architecting analysis in Japan.
Based on the results of the analysis, Chapter 8 gives conclusions concerning the usefulness
of lean enterprise architecting for railway industries and future suggestions of strategy for
the Shinkansen extension projects in Japan. It also gives some suggestions for the high
speed railway in Portugal.
Figure 1-3 provides a graphic illustration of the thesis structure.
Chapter 1: Introduction
Background of high speed rail in Japan and outline of this thesis
Focus on Japanese railway Compare with foreign countries
Chapter 2: Outline of Japanese Chapter 4: International Comparison
Railway System of Railway Systems
Recent history of Japan's nationwide railway Case Studies ofNetwork * The United Kingdom
Focus on high speed rail * Germany
Chapter 3: High Speed Railway Systems
in Japan Compare with the Japanese
Characteristics of the system extended Shinkansen lines
Ownership of infrastructure
Utilize it for the later analysis
Chapter 5: Introduction of Lean Enterprise Architecting
The idea is based on Nightingale's class at MIT and LAI
pply the concepts
Chapter 6: Application of Lean Enterprise Architecting of New Shinkansen Projects in Japan
*The lean enterprise architecting concept is applied to the new Shinkansen extension projects in Japan
*Check the usefulness of the lean enterprise architecting concept/ framework for understanding the problems
in railway industries
_J Lx and the concepts into general and Portugal's case
Chapter 7: Case Study of Portugal
It suggests how one would architect the lean enterprise for high speed rail in Portugal.
-- [Conclusion of the thesis
Chapter 8: Conclusion
Usefulness of lean enterprise architecting for railway industries
Suggestion of future strategy of the Shinkansen extension project in Japan
Suggestion of Future strategy of high speed rail in Portugal
I
Figure 1-3 Graphic Illustration of the Thesis Structure
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Chapter 2. Recent History of Japan's Nationwide Railway
Network
The JNR (Japanese National Railways, a public corporation) was established in 1949 [6].
80 percent of Japan's railways were JNR, while 20 percent were and are regional, local and
urban railways outside of the national government system.
Since the break up of JNR, the JNR was separated into six JR passenger railway companies
(the Japan Railway companies: JR East, Central, West, Shikoku, Kyushu, and Hokkaido)
and the nationwide freight railway company, JR Freight. The maintenance of infrastructure
/ locomotives / trains and the operation in each of the six regions is managed by the
region's passenger railway company. The infrastructure includes almost everything such as
tracks, maintenance facilities, stations and buildings. In terms of the ownership of
infrastructure, the Shinkansen lines are owned by either JR companies or a governmental
organization with a lease contract, and all other conventional lines are solely owned by JR
companies.
On the other hand, the freight rail company has very little of its own rail infrastructure.
Except for short freight-only branches and terminal facilities, JR Freight operates on lines
owned by passenger railway companies and has to pay the charge for this usage. This is a
difficult situation. This relationship between the passenger rail and freight rail company is
the opposite situation from the U.S relationship. It is a result of the weaker competitive
position of railway freight in Japan.
Following are the key factors of the history of the recent history of Japan's nationwide
railway network.
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2.1. Era of JNR (Before the break up in 1987)
Before the reform in 1987, 80 percent of the Japanese railways were owned and operated
by the fully integrated monopoly railway entity, JNR from 1949. Total capital and
operating cost of JNR developed during the 1960s and the government had carried
extensive debt for the considerable cost until the reform in 1987. JNR had two
characteristics which made the management worse. First, JNR was a public, governmental
organization. Second, it was a huge management organization which was uniform in all
areas [2]. These two elements made JNR unable to cope with the changing circumstances
surrounding the railway industry. Specifically:
<<Problems in terms of the nationwide big organization >>
1. Too big organization which exceeds the capacity for management
JNR was too big for managers to keep up on the situation of each worksite and this caused
difficulty in carrying out their policy. Then the corporate loyalty and vitality among
workers drastically dwindled and JNR lost control for its organizational management.
2. Uniform Operation all over Japan
Railway operation should be different from area to area to adapt to the economy and traffic
situation in each area. However, the basic policy for such as fares, wages, and timetables
was determined uniformly by head office.
3. Cross-Subsidy within JNR
The accounting management was not separated by area or department. Each area or
department had become interdependent by cross-subsidy. This cross-subsidy reduced the
incentives for the organization to reduce costs and aim for a certain profit target and finally
let the management of JNR become less efficient.
4. Lack of competitive consciousness
JNR was much bigger than any other railway company in Japan and this in turn led to a
lack of competitive consciousness. As a result, JNR lacked the ability to respond to the
highly competitive transportation market while automobile use was growing.
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<<Problem in terms of the public organization>>
1. External Interference and lack of management autonomy
The most important issues for management such as budget, fare and selection of executives
were influenced by government and politicians. Especially, politicians often forced JNR to
construct new railways and new stations for the benefit of their election districts. Even
though some construction was unprofitable for JNR, JNR could not avoid these
unprofitable, inefficient investments since the budget and personnel were determined by the
government. In this situation, management autonomy was eliminated and it became
ambiguous who should be responsible for the management and investment of JNR.
2. Unstable Labor-Management Relationship
There was a lack of ability to solve problems between labor and management. For example,
JNR could not make decisions in terms of wages, which are one of the most important
components of working labor conditions, because changing wages needed approval by the
Diet. Furthermore, employees and labor unions thought JNR would never go bankrupt
because JNR was a public sector corporation owned by the government. In this way,
motivation was decreased, the discipline rules were ignored, and the relationship between
labor and management got worse.
3. Restrictions of the area of business for JNR
The business of JNR was restricted to railways and supplemental transportation (buses and
ferries) because it was not a private company. Therefore, it was difficult to have diversified
and flexible business activity other than transportation even though this could have
increased corporate revenue.
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2.2. Break Up / Reform of JNR in 1987
To solve all these problems, JNR was divided and privatized. Figure 2-1 shows the overall
organizational structure right after the reform of JNR in 1987. JNR was broken up into 6
private passenger rail companies based on the six distinct geographic regions and a
nationwide freight rail company. Both infrastructure and operation were managed by each
of the six private passenger rail companies. In this early stage, all the railway companies
were special companies owned by JNR Settlement Corporation, a governmental
organization. But all of the stock was intended to be sold in the stock market to obtain the
independent management from the government as a pure private company. Nowadays, all
of the profitable companies, JR East, Central, West on the main island, have been fully
privatized through sale of the corporate stock. However, the other three unprofitable
companies (Shikoku, Kyushu, Hokkaido Railway company) has not been privatized yet.
JNRSC (Japanese National Railways
Settlement Corporation)
Governmental Organization
Holding 100% of the stock Lease Sh inkan
infrastruc
<<Passenger Railway Company>>
East Japan Railway Company
Central Japan Railway Company-
West Japan Railway Company
Hokkaido Railway Company
Sikoku Railway Company
Kyushu Railway Company
*They own infrastructure except Shinkansen
t Payment for use I Provide use
Shinkansen Holding Company (SHC)
sen
ture Lease Payment
These are on the main island
and profitable
Fundamental Fund
+Cfor Management Stability
riahts on infrastructure
<<Freight Railway Company>>
Japan Freight Railway Company
Source: JR East [2]
Figure 2-1 Organizational structure of Japanese railway right after the reform in 1987
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Infrastructure
Each private passenger railway company owns the infrastructure / locomotives / trains and
the operation in each separated area. The infrastructure includes almost all fixed facilities
such as tracks, maintenance facilities, stations and buildings. Each passenger railway
company also maintains and operates the railway in its geographic area. On the other hand,
JR Freight has very little of its own infrastructure and pays a relatively low
government-determined access fee, kept low as a form of subsidy.
However, for the existing Shinkansen lines in this early stage, the SHC (Shinkansen
Holding Company), a governmental organization, owned them while the conventional lines
were owned by the JR companies. JR East, West and Central had to pay the lease payment
based on frequency of usage to the SHC. The lease payment was used for paying back the
debt which JNR had created and for the adjustment and leveling of profit among passenger
railway companies that held the Shinkansen lines. (Even though there is a cross subsidy
inside each company, there is a difference in terms of the profitability because some lines
are very profitable and some are not.) As indicated in Chapter 3, this SHC has not existed
since 1991 because all the infrastructure of the existing Shinkansen lines were purchased
by the three JR companies on the main island.
Financial Issues
The JNR accumulated about Y37 trillion of long-term debt. Y25.5 trillion was assigned to a
newly created entity, the JNRSC (Japanese National Railways Settlement Corporation),
Y5.9 trillion was assigned to the three JR companies in the main island and JR Freight and
Y5.7 trillion was assigned to SHC. Figure 2-2 shows the debt replacement and the source of
repayment proposed in 1987. Total JR companies' payment was supposed to be 14.5 trillion
in which Y8.5 trillion was supposed to be paid as lease payment from JR companies
through SHC.
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Debt Replacement [in trillion yen]
JNRSC : Y25.5 SHC : Y5.7 JR companies : Y5.9
The Source of repayment proposed in 1987
JR companies Lease Payment
Sale of JR Companies Stock: 1.3 to SHC : 8.5
1040 10 4
Citizens, Tax Payer:13.8 Sale of Land: 7.7 JR companies
Source: JR East [2]
Figure 2-2 The Debt Replacement and the Source of Repayment Proposed in 1987
In 1991, the JR companies in the main island acquired the existing Shinkansen lines at the
transfer price of Y9.1 trillion. The amount of Y8.5 trillion of the principal payment minus
YO.5 trillion of the four and a half years lease payment by the JR companies is Y8.0 trillion.
This amount has been paid as amortization payment of 25.5 years for the repayment of the
long-term debt. However, an additional Y1.1 trillion was charged to JR companies by a
government decision to raise the assessed value of the assets. This additional Y1. 1 trillion
has been paid as an amortization payment based on the 60 years equal payment method and
used for the newly extended Shinkansen projects.
Subsidies
There are no subsidies for the JR East, Central, West. JR Freight doesn't have any direct
subsidy but pays relatively low government-determined access fees for using the tracks of
passenger railway companies. On the other hand, the three other unprofitable companies
are allowed to have a one-time Business Stabilization Fund which was given in 1987 as a
subsidy. They are not allowed to draw down the principal; only the interest or profits from
investment are allowed to be invested for operations and capital improvements. In this way,
in terms of the reform, there are still some problems for the JR Freight and the passenger
railway companies on the smaller islands.
This chapter focuses on the Japanese recent history of Japan's nationwide railway network.
The next chapter offers various schemes for high speed rail in Japan.
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Chapter 3. Schemes for Pre-existing Shinkansen Lines, New
Shinkansen Lines and Extended Shinkansen Lines in Japan
Figure 3-1 shows existing Shinkansen lines and ongoing projects for new and extended
Shinkansen lines in Japan [7].
Shinkansen lines which were in operation before the new Shinkansen project
.rw- New Shinkansen lines which were now operating
- New Shinkansen lines which are now under construction
SSapporo
Hokkaido Shinkansen
-m New Shinkansen lines which the government is now
planning for the foreseeable future Seikan Hakodate
aa e a Conventional lines converted for Akita Shinkansen Tunnel
extension of Shinkansen service Aomor
Yamagata Shi kansen Akita Hachinohe
Joetsu Shin nsen
Morioka
Nagano Shinkansen Yamagata
J R West Area r; . Niaa## A
JRT ya a We t A e Ni a andal Tohoku Shinkansen
Kanazaw oyma Fukushima
--- Fukui Nagano
Takasaki
e miya
Tokyo JR East Area
Osaka
Tokaido Shinkansen
JR Kyushu Area JR Central Area
Drawn by Author
Figure 3-1 Shinkansen Lines and Ongoing Shinkansen Projects
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3.1. Schemes for Pre-existing Shinkansen Lines
Pre-existing Shinkansen Lines are the lines which had already constructed by JNR before
the privatization. The first Shinkansen, Tokaido Shinkansen line was opened in 1964 and
the construction cost was huge [8]. Also the maximum speed was 200 km/h while the
fastest speed of operating trains in the world was 160 km/h in France [8]. 547 million
dollars was budgeted, but the actual construction cost was 1058 million dollars (1
dollar=360 Yen) which was very huge at that time [8]. It was also financed by debt
including the 80 million dollars of loan from World Bank since the interest rate was low at
5.75 %. (The payback was completed in 1981.)[8] This development was possible due to
the power of JNR as a governmental organization and cooperative relationship between
JNR and the government. Then, the Tohoku and Joetsu Shinkansen lines opened in 1982.
After the privatization of JNR, these Shinkansen lines were operated under a 30-year lease
contract between SHC (Shinkansen Holding Company) which is a governmental
organization and JR. The lease payments were intended to allow SHC to pay back the V8.5
trillion of debt [2]. These lines were acquired by JR East, Central, West in 1991. JR East
acquired the Tohoku and Joetsu Shinkansen Lines for the following reasons.
* After the 30 year lease term, the infrastructure of these lines was intended to be
transferred into JR companies, but the contract did not include the information
whether the transfer is without charge or not. Furthermore, allocation rate of
lease payment for each JR company can be changed under the lease contract
and the JR companies could not be certain of the amount of asset and debt,
which is a disadvantage for the later full privatization.
* Depreciation expense could not be recorded since the infrastructure is not the
asset of JR companies even though the maintenance and renewal was supposed
to be done by JR companies.
The Japanese government agreed with these reasons, aiming for the listing of stock, and the
JR companies in the main island acquired the existing Shinkansen lines at the transfer price
of Y9.1 trillion [2]. In the operators' point of view, it has huge impact on the finance. For
example, JR East paid Y3.1 trillion and acquired Tohoku and Joetsu Shinkansen Lines [2].
26
However, the large amount of debt, approximately Y3 trillion issued in 1991 has huge
impact on the budget of JR East [2]. It is almost the same amount as V3.3 trillion that JR
East inherited as a debt from JNR when the JNR broke up in 1987 [2]. (In JR East, the
consolidated annual revenue is about V2.6 trillion, retained earnings are Y270 billion and
net earnings are Y158 million in 2005) Figure 3-2 shows the long-term debt of JR East
after the break up of JNR and Table 3-1 outlines the long-term debt for acquiring Tohoku
and Joetsu Shinkansen in 1991. Therefore, in terms of the financial issues, there are still
problems to be solved after the reform.
Figure 3-2 Long-term Debt of JR East after the
Source: JR East [9]
break up of JNR [in108 Yen]
Table 3-1 Long term debt for acquiring Tohoku and Joetsu Shinkansen in 1991 [in 108 Yen]
Repayment Term Repayment Method Interest Rate Principal Outstanding
Balance in 2005
1991.10 - 2017.3 Principal and interest 4.5% 21018 9597
1991.10 - 2017.3 equal repayment 6.35% 6385 3984
1991.10 - 2051.9 by every six month 6.55% 3665 3544
Total installments 31069 17125
Source: JR East [10]
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3.2. Schemes for the Small-sized new Shinkansen Lines
The Yamagata Shinkansen has been operated since 1992 and the Akita Shinkansen since
1997 [11]. The scheme of these newly extended lines was different from the usual scheme
for Shinkansen extensions. JR East changed the track gauge of the existing lines from 1067
mm to the Shinkansen gauge of 1435 mm of Shinkansen lines, which allowed operations
direct from the existing Shinkansen lines to each of the new destinations. This method was
used to reduce the construction cost. However, the maximum speed of trains on these
sections is only 130 km/h which is not much different from local trains. The infrastructure
is owned by JR East and the operation is also done by JR East. In this scheme, the local
government and Japanese government injected interest-free public money into the
construction cost for these lines in the form of loans.
3.3. Schemes for New Shinkansen Lines
New Shinkansen lines are planned as the extension project by the Japanese government
under the new Shinkansen law. The new Shinkansen lines are either operating or under
construction or planned for construction in the foreseeable future by the government. In JR
East, there are two big new Shinkansen projects, Hokkaido and Hokuriku Shinkansen
projects, both of which need mutual operation with neighboring railway companies.
Hokkaido Shinkansen is a new Shinkansen project, an extension of Tohoku Shinkansen
from Morioka to Sapporo. The section between Morioka and Hachinohe has already been
constructed in 2002 and is now operated by JR East. The section between Hachinohe and
Aomori is now under construction. The section between Aomori and Hakodate which will
be the area of JR Hokkaido has recently begun to be constructed and it will be completed
before 2015 [7]. This new line will allow travel between Tokyo and Hakodate in three and
half hours and the market will be competitive with the air [7]. The flight time is 80 minutes
but there is much more waiting time associated with air travel. Further construction for the
section between Hakodate and Sapporo, the capital of Hokkaido may be scheduled after
2010 and JR East and Hokkaido will be better able to compete with airline industry more.
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The Hokuriku Shinkansen line is under the new Shinkansen project between Tokyo and
Osaka along the Hokuriku Route. The section between Takasaki and Nagano which is now
called Nagano Shinkansen line is an extension branch of the existing Joetsu Shinkansen
Line. This section was constructed in 1997 for Nagano Olympics. The section between
Nagano, Toyama and Kanazawa is now being constructed and the section between
Kanazawa, Fukui and Osaka is not yet budgeted. This new Shinkansen line is very
convenient for the connection between Kanazawa or Toyama and Tokyo. Also, if the line is
connected to Osaka, this line will compete in some travel markets for the Tokaido
Shinkansen line of JR Central, as well as with airlines.
All of the new Shinkansen lines are operated or will be operated under the lease contract
between JR companies and the Japanese Government by the new Shinkansen law. Some
details of the contract were made by negotiation between JR companies and Japanese
Government. JR companies lease the infrastructure from JRTT 4, operate with their own
rolling stock, and maintain all the leased infrastructure. Table 3-2 shows the characteristics
of the lease contract.
4 JRTT : Japan Railway Construction, Transport and Technology Agency. This agency was a
governmental organization. It has recently become the Independent Administrative Legal Entity.
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Table 3-2 Characteristics of the lease contract for New Shinkansen Lines, revised in 1997
Construction Agency JRTT : Japan Railway Construction, Transport and Technology
Agency
Planning Agency Japanese Government
The agreement with JR companies and JRTT is necessary.
Budget Allocation Before Construction:
Japanese Government : Local Government = 2: 1
After Construction :
JR East will repay the Lease Repayment.
The amount of repayment per year is determined by and within
the profit from the constructed line.
How to compute the Fixed price will be used for 30 years.
lease payment -
The changing revenue caused by the construction of the new
Shinkansen line
Deficits of conventional railway lines paralleled by the new
Shinkansen line
Lease Term 30 years
After the Lease Term This will depend on negotiation between JR companies and
JRCPC
Other Agreement * The construction will not negatively impact the management of
JR companies.
* Separate the management of local railways parallel to the new
Shinkansen line from JR companies. (Allows JR East to
reduce cross subsidy to the unprofitable lines.)
Other conditions In case of disasters which exceed the coverage of the civil
engineering completed risks insurance, JR companies and JRCPC
will negotiate with each other.
Source: Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport [7]
This chapter focuses on the various schemes for high speed rail in Japan. The next chapter
offers international comparison of the railway systems among Japan, Germany, and the
U.K.
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Chapter 4. International Comparison of the Railway Systems
Before considering the lean enterprise in the development of the Shinkansen in Chapter 6,
international comparisons are necessary to understand the general characteristics and
potential problems associated with the railway industry. These will point out the common
goals that we need to aim at and serve as an important reminder about reform and
development when introducing the lean enterprise concept.
Before reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, most national railways were considered to be
political instruments and there were interventions reflecting the regional interests of
politicians [12]. Politically-directed decision making was one of the major factors in the
negative economic performance of national railways. National railways in Japan and
Europe needed to be reformed to remedy low productivity and efficiency, financial
problems like large liabilities and long-term debts, and weak competitiveness which
resulted in low shares of the passenger and freight transport markets. After the reforms,
each national railway had a different privatization level and railway system. In this chapter,
the cases of the United Kingdom and Germany are compared with the general railway
system and the system of the new Shinkansen lines in Japan.
4.1. EU Directive 91/440/EEC
The reform of railways in European Unions has a strong relationship with the EU Directive
91/440/EEC. The strong influence of this directive can be seen in the German railway
reform of 1994.
In 1991, EU Directive 91/440/EEC was promulgated.5 [12] Under this directive, all EU
railway companies were obliged to ensure that international groupings in the EU could
access their railway network in order to create a single transport market.
5 It was amended in Directive 2001/12/EC in 2001
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To achieve this goal, EU Directive 91/440/EEC prescribes the following:
* Increase the independence of railway companies
* Restructure and build a strong financial base
*Make a vertical separation between infrastructure and operations to improve
competitiveness
The minimum requirement of this directive was to create separate divisions in terms of
accounting within a single railway entity. Cross-subsidy between operators and the
infrastructure entity was forbidden. Only a few members of the EU went beyond the
minimum requirements for vertical separation of infrastructure and operations.
As a result, in EU countries, it became necessary to open the market to third parties in order
to build a single united transportation market. Therefore, in any future reforms or railway
construction in EU countries, EU Directive 91/440/EEC must be considered as a constraint.
4.2. Germany
4.2.1. The Reform of DBAG in 1991
Before the railway reform of 1994, German railways had serious problems of a decline in
the railway share of the total transport market, inefficiency, and political intervention
concerning unprofitable lines. In 1993, the total amount of loss in DB (Deutsche
Bundesbahn) in West Germany and DR (Deutsche Reichsbahn) in East Germany was 15.6
billion DM (Y1.9 trillion) and their total outstanding debt had reached 70 billion DM (Y4.9
trillion), which was larger than total DB assets by 1.3 billion DM. It was estimated that the
continuation of this current railway system would make the total burden of the federal
government increase by 570 billion DM (Y39.9 trillion) from 1994 to 2002 [12].
In 1994, Germany merged the two national railway properties, DB in West Germany and
DR in East Germany, into the Federal Railway Property Agency (BEV). The commercial
section of BEV was separated and transformed into DBAG, a state-owned joint-stock
holding company. The present structure of DBAG is shown in Figure 4-1. There are three
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major group divisions, "Passenger Transport" for operations, "Transport and Logistics" for
the freight railway, and "Infrastructure and Services" for maintaining the infrastructure
[13].
Group Division
Passenger Transport
Transport and Logistics
Business Units
Long-Distance Transport
Regional Transport
Urban Transport
DB Netz :
Track Infrastructure
Infrastructure and Services Passenger Stations
Energy
Services
Figure 4-1 Present Structure of DBAG
In the reform, DBAG started without any past debt since the German federal government
relieved DBAG of 70 billion DM (Y4.9 trillion) and transferred the responsibility for
paying and managing the debt to BEV. Additionally, the federal government paid about 19
billion DM (Y1.3 trillion) per year to BEV for debt relief and other administrative
responsibilities [14].
Operations and Access Fees
Since the infrastructure and operations are separate business units with separate financial
accounting, both passenger and freight rail are open to competition. For example, there are
300 different operators providing rail service in Germany [14]. However, DBAG operates
most of the rail service in Germany, and we can say that it is not a completely competitive
market.
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Reform in 1994
BEV
One of the major characteristics of the 1994 reform was the funding system for regional
passenger rail operations. National government funding for the short distance passenger
railway service goes directly to the LUnder (German federal states) and not directly to the
operators. There are bids to choose operators, but LUnder do not have to tender the service
to multiple operators and they can also let DB continue operations. The contracts are
usually for 10 to 15 years. This delegation of local railway operation to local governments
makes the decision making about local service better since the payer and the contracting
party are both the Land (federal state), which means that the contracting party has to have
responsibility for both the service and the financing. It also eliminates the cross-subsidy
within an operator. The national government provides 7 billion euros ($8.9 billion) to the
hinder annually [14]. This subsidy to the Linder comes from the fuel tax in addition to the
conventional transportation improvement fund (GVFG) [12].
Long-distance rail operators have to pay infrastructure access fees. These access fees are
based on the following equation and were supposed to be equal for all operators [12].
Access Fee = Basic Charge * (Modification Coefficient)
Basic Charge: This is based on the types of track and trains.
Types of Trains: Passenger train is from P1 to P7, freight train is from GI to G5
The class is based on the speed, weight and quality.
Types of Track : The quality of the track and the and traffic density
Modification Coefficient : The coefficient of heavier trains like heavy freight trains
is more than one since they require more track maintenance. On
the other hand, the coefficient of lighter trains and trains which do
not need to operate reliably on schedule is less than one. A longer
distance of runs and longer-term contract periods both reduce the
coefficient.
In most EU member countries, a governmental regulator sets the fees. However, DBAG
sets the fees by itself and then receives approval from the Federal Railway Office (EBA)
[14]. Only when agreement can not be reached will the EBA arbitrate it.
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Infrastructure
German rail infrastructure is owned by a single state-owned private-stock company, DB
Netz (Network). DB Netz is one of DBAG's corporate business units and owns most of the
rail infrastructure network in Germany.
The income of DB Netz is the rail access fees and the subsidy from the German
government. DB Netz receives 2.5 billion euros of subsidy per year for the maintenance of
current infrastructure and 1.5 billion euros per year for renewal and new infrastructure [14].
(The infrastructure includes stations.)
In the original plan for the reforming of the German railway system, each operating unit
and DB Netz were supposed to be separated into different companies based on the EU
Directive 91/440/EEC. However, the operating units and the infrastructure units are still
under DBAG, a holding company, and DBAG is now aiming for an integrated railway
system because the integrated system strengthens the entire DB system competencies [13].
Although DBAG has the highest technology in Europe, they still try to learn from foreign
countries. For example, in Germany, the reliable on-time performance of the Japanese
railway system is highly regarded and DBAG tends to learn from the Japanese railway
under a cooperative relationship with the JR companies. In this sense, they have chosen to
have an integrated system and just satisfy the minimum requirement in which the
operations and infrastructure are separated in financial accounting as in the EU Directive
91/440/EEC.
Currently there is ongoing debate whether DBAG should continue to be a state-owned
private-stock company or become a publicly traded company. The biggest debate now is
whether the initial public offering of DBAG will include its share of DB Netz. DBAG
officials consider that the infrastructure of DB Netz should be in an initial public offering
for financial reasons. Government officials also expect great financial benefits to public
from a joined initial public offering, but there are concerns that this system will make DB
Netz less able to "influence infrastructure decisions" than it is today [14].
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4.2.2. Benefits associated with the new system
Even though the reform was not a rapid change as in the U.K and Japan, there have been
some benefits from the reform, as follows:
* Efficiency: From 1996 to 1998, the divisions of DBAG were reduced in number and
restructured into integrated business units. Also, the number of employees has been
decreased from 322,383 in 1996 to 220,343 in 2005 [12] [13]. There is potential to have
further efficiency gains in the future.
* Introduction of access fees: access fees were introduced to make the railway industry a
competitive market. Yet there is still monopoly involved [12]. This system of separation
between infrastructure and operation satisfied the EU requirement and has a potential to
encourage a more competitive market, which may increase efficiency.
* Each railway line has an entity clearly responsible for it, and this entity wants to continue
the line in operation or construct a new line. If the line is profitable, DBAG is completely
responsible for the line. If it is unprofitable but in the public interest, states or the federal
will be responsible for whether the line will exist or not and they will have to pay the
subsidy. In other words, each line has independent financing and there is no cross subsidy
inside DBAG. Under this new policy, total operating length of DBAG decreased from
41,300 km in1994 to 34,200 km in 2005 [13]. Cross subsidy between lines makes the
necessity and desirability of lines unclear. Germany's reformed system has more
opportunity for the railway industry to restructure unprofitable railway lines correctly
with less political intervention than reforms in Japan.
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4.2.3. Problems associated with the new system
Problems Associated with the Investment
In Germany, the federal government is obliged to gather most of the necessary capital
investment for railway. The federal government has to take care of the finances of the
railway infrastructure while railway companies such as DBAG have to cover the
maintenance costs. However, if the newly constructed line is absolutely necessary for the
operation of the railway companies, railway companies have to pay at least an amount that
is the same as their depreciation expense for the capital cost. If the construction is for the
public interest, the railway companies pay either a portion of the depreciation expense or
zero. The portion of payment from the railway companies to the federal government
depends on negotiation [12]. This rule makes the political intervention less since DBAG
can make its own decision.
However, this vague rule may encourage a strategic action by DBAG, in which DBAG can
get the federal government to invest in new lines for the public interest by denying that the
new lines are needed by DBAG. of the new lines. On the other hand, if there is some
political pressure on DBAG, DBAG may have to pay some portion of the investment even
though the new line is not necessary for DBAG. The negotiation base rule includes some
risks associated with the vagueness.
Problems Associated with the Access Fee
In Germany, since the reform of 1991, the access fee has been based on the depreciation
expense of the infrastructure [12]. For this estimation, asset evaluations are very important.
At the establishment of the balance sheet of DBAG in 1991, the assessment of total assets
was reduced to lower the depreciation expense, because rail operators might not have set
fares low enough to compete with other transportation modes if the access charge had been
higher and included all the maintenance costs [12]. Also, under the commercial law,
business enterprises have to assess their assets at the lowest level and they have the right to
depreciate economically inefficient assets. However, in 1991, the assets of DBAG were
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assessed at the extremely low value of 20 billion DM (Y1.4 trillion), which was reduced
from the real value by 80 billion DM (Y5.6 trillion) [12]. In fact, DBAG ignored actual
recent investment costs and set the capital cost too low. For example, it cost 15 billion DM
(Y1 1 trillion) to construct the sections for high speed rail between Mannheim and Stuttgart
(99km) and between Hannover and Wurzburg (327km), which began to be operated at that
time [12]. Under the new laws, DBAG was able to reduce the value of their assets to an
exaggerated degree, especially economically efficient high speed rail links mentioned
above.
After the reform, when the new infrastructure was constructed, subsidies reduced the
reported value of DBAG's assets so that the access fees would be lower. These subsidies, in
the form of investment grants for railways, had been authorized for the purchase or
construction of fixed assets and are still distributed mainly by the federal government [13].
In the financial accounting, the investment grants do not affect the income statement but
they can reduce the acquisition or construction costs of DBAG, and this reduction can
lower the reported asset and depreciation expenses. The intention of the investment grants
is to lower the access fees over the entire useful life of assets.
As a result, this underestimation of the value of DBAG's assets has made the access fee
low enough to be competitive with other modes of transportation. However, in the long
term perspective, DBAG will have to invest in the existing lines for maintenance and
replacement. This actual cost in the future will be substantial in comparison to the total
revenue from access fees which were set in accordance with the reduced depreciation
calculation. The present underestimation of the value of the assets will probably make the
DBAG financially unstable in the long run.
To solve this future problem, DBAG should change the access fee that is mainly based on
the depreciation expense of the infrastructure. If DBAG does not change it and gets
subsidies for the future maintenance or replacement, these additional subsidies may ruin the
hope of full efficient privatization. Therefore, the access fee should be based on the cost to
maintain the assets at their original value. However, this decision requires trade off between
those higher access fees and the competitiveness with other transportation modes. If
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competition with other transportation modes does not allow the access fees to be increased,
it may be necessary to reduce the number of unprofitable lines or the quality of assets.
Actually, several of the money-losing long-distance routes that were in operation have been
shut down by DBAG in compliance with public laws [14]. The reduction of money-losing
routes is a very appropriate way to make the railway industry prosper.
4.2.4. Summary of German Railway System and its Reform
The reform of German railways since 1991 did not make any radical changes and it kept
the integration of the system by separating the operations and infrastructure only in
financial accounting and in units, which was the minimum requirement of EU Directive
91/440/EEC. Through the reform, the system obtained more efficiency to some extent,
introduced access fees, and was freed from the excessive financial burden of the
unprofitable lines. The system established for each unprofitable line a corresponding
federal state responsible for ensuring payment and making the decision whether the line
will be continued or not.
However, there remain many problems. First, subsidies, especially for capital investment,
may result in less effort of DBAG toward efficiency and increase the tendency to rely on
subsidies. Also, a lower reported asset value (depreciation expense) and its consequent
lower access fees will probably make the DBAG financially unstable in the long term,
although lower access fees allow railways to compete with other transportation modes.
In Germany, the federal government needs to continue to reform the railway industry,
taking into consideration the competition from other transportation modes, well-balanced
profit and cost for each stakeholder, asset evaluation and adequate access fees, and more
fully specified schemes for subsides.
In the next section, the most radical reform of railways, the reform of British railways, will
be introduced, in contrast to the soft reform of the German railways.
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4.3. The United Kingdom
4.3.1. The Reform of British Railways
In the first seven years after the privatization of BR (British Railways) in 1994, there were
many separate companies, as below [12] [15].
1. ROSCOs: three separate companies in charge of maintenance of rolling stock and
engines.
2. TOCs: 25 passenger train operating companies which leased trains from ROSCOs
3. Four freight companies.
4. Railtrack : the owner of the rail tracks, stations and other infrastructure. Railtrack
charged access fees to the train operators.
5. Thirteen separate companies that contracted with Railtrack to provide their
services. They originated from the BR's engineering and maintenance divisions.
After the reform, all of the organizations were supposed to work together under the
contracts and the government regulations in the new competitive market.
Some Compromises in the Transition Period
However, the governing political party at that time, the Conservative Party, was uncertain
about the interest of buyers and wanted to allay the fears of the bidders, who were
concerned about the negative effects of fierce competition [16]. In order to make sure that
sale of each section of BR would be successful, the government did as follows:
First, all of the railway companies bought their portions of the railway at discounted prices.
Actually, their stock price was higher after the sell-off from the government. For example,
the government wrote off most of Railtrack's debt, selling Railtrack at the very low share
price of £3.90, and the price of these shares rose to £17.68 in 1998 [16]. Another example
is that the government sold one of three ROSCOs at E527 million and then a new ROSCO,
Stagecoach, later bought it at E824 million pounds [12]. In this way, only these private
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companies got vast profits in this transition period and the citizens who paid taxes and used
the rail did not receive any benefit from the reform.
Second, the government gave to some extent local monopolies to operators and gave
valuable subsidies to lines that were not profitable. Under the agreement of OPRAF,6 the
government could grant a subsidy equal to the amount of operating expenditure minus fare
revenue for TOCs. In return, TOCs and Railtrack were forced to operate the unprofitable
lines for political reasons even though they were private companies. As a result, Railtrack
and TOCs were monopolies to some extent, because there was no true competition in the
system. This system did not reflect the original purpose of privatization.
Accidents after the Privatization
In just a few years, many organizational problems appeared. As a result of contracts and
government regulation, the only incentive for railway companies was to seek increased
revenue. Trains and facilities like stations got dirty and overcrowded and the passengers
complained much more than before [16]. The new private companies were not interested in
improving these problems since these did not directly affect the ridership figures and
revenue.
Partly as a result of the poor management by new private companies, 38 people died in
railway accidents in the first three years (42 deaths in the first four years) in contrast with
only eight rail fatalities from 1990 to 1997 [16]. On October 17, 2000, an accident occurred
in Hatfield. Four people were killed by a train derailment because a cracked rail "shattered"
into 300 pieces, a crack that Railtrack had known about but had not fixed. After the
accident, they decided to have speed limits of 20 mph at 1286 places where there was
evidence of cracking [16]. The overreaction was due to the lack of knowledge about the
condition of its assets. This decision led to many delays and cancelled services, which
seriously damaged Railtrack's financial condition. Under the terms of its contracts and its
consequences, Railtrack had to pay the TOCs penalties for each of the delays under the
6 Office of Passenger Rail Franchising, a governmental corporation which regulates all the private
companies in the railway industry.
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terms of its contracts. Railtrack lost a total of £534 million pounds from the Hatfield
accident while the profit in the previous year was only E360 million [16]. Finally, Railtrack
increased its debt to E3.3 billion.
4.3.2. Benefits of the Reform
Even though the reform in the U.K. has had adverse effects, there have also been some
benefits from the reform, as follows:
* Fares: some fares were reduced and new fare systems such as off-peak pricing were set
up.
* Efficiency: more constructive negotiation with the labor unions reduced staffing
inefficiencies. For example, in Freightliner, the crew of four was reduced to just one
driver with the introduction of containers [12]. Through such negotiations, drivers got
higher salaries while the total cost was reduced.
* Investment in better quality of service by TOCs: some of the TOCs invested substantially
in new rolling stock and the new West Coast Line [12]. Good market research and
investment made the railway industry prosperous.
4.3.3. The Problems of the Reform
Inequitable Contracts
The contracts between Railtrack and TOCs were inequitable in that they were not adequate
to provide sufficient value to each of the stakeholders, especially financially. In its contract,
since 90% of the access fees that TOCs paid to Railtrack were fixed, Railtrack had no
incentive to invest in increasing the capacity, while the TOCs had an incentive to increase
the service. Since it is common knowledge that rail damage and extent of maintenance
work required is determined by the tons of rolling stock that pass on the rails, this fixed
charge was not fair to Railtrack. As a result, there was no incentive for Railtrack to plan
capital investment to adapt to changes of circumstance. Then, the increased operation
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which was introduced by TOCs exceeded the capacity of the railway and caused rail
congestion. Actually, because of the booming economy between 1996 and 2000, the usage
of railways increased by 30% [12]. The TOCs responded by increasing the number of trains,
putting on a thousand extra runs from 1997 to 1999 [12]. The contract let operators adapt to
the changes and worked well. However, Railtrack underestimated the increase in delays
caused by the increased service. TOCs blamed Railtrack for not investing in new capacity,
but this was because of Railtrack's lack of incentive and of enough budget for investment.
In an equitable contract, variable access fees would be charged based on the number of
trains operated on each section, in order to prevent congestion and maintain the safety of
the rail for through investment.
Additionally, for the measurement of railway congestion, the contract should have included
the maximum frequency on each section and incremental fees to pay for the investment to
increase the rail capacity.
In any events, two of the major accidents could have been avoided with advanced safety
equipment and adequate maintenance/investment. Railtrack could not invest adequately
because of the lack of the required capital that resulted from the inequitable contracts.
Lack of integration of the entire railway system
Separation between operation and infrastructure and its competitive market for the railway
turned out to be much more difficult to manage than for the gas, telecommunications, and
electricity industry. Constraints from the necessary interrelationships among the sections of
the railway system prevent the expected management changes.
The unbundled structure - the separation of infrastructure and operations - reduced the
cooperative relationship between Railtrack and operators that was necessary for the safety
and on-time performance of the operation. Also, even though TOCs were subject to the
physical constraints of the railway, the competitive market of TOCs reduced the
cooperation between them. In fact, when accidents or delays happened, Railtrack and TOCs
often blamed each other and did not try to find a future optimal solution together; they just
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tried to reduce their penalties rather than improving the situation. The lower integration of
the unbundled structure shifted the entire system toward blame rather than improvement.
In summary, the railway system became "dis-integrated" by the separation between
operation and infrastructure, and by the contracts between different organizations
associated with the separation. The non-integration reduced the safety and on-time
performance of the U.K. railways.
Lack of Government Management Ability
In addition to the problems of contracts, one of the reasons why the accidents happened
was the low investment for maintenance before privatization. The quality of the assets was
very poor because the government had made the investment toward the railways extremely
low before the reform. The government, especially the Conservative Party, was highly
focused on road investment instead of railways. Also, the British government reduced their
subsidy to railways by 50 % from 1983 to 1990 in order to achieve its financial goals [12].
The BR coped with the situation by selling off their important assets and doing less
investment in maintenance, safety, congestion avoidance and convenience, even though
consequences for the safety and the quality of maintenance would become evident several
years later. As a result, the very poor maintenance and investment in the railways before the
reform put the privatized companies in a financially difficult situation.
After the privatization, the government continued to lack an effective management. The
Office of Passenger Rail Franchising, the Office of the Rail Regulator, Her Majesty's
Railway Inspectorate, the British Railway Board, the Rail Passengers Council, and the
Transport Secretary had overlapping responsibilities, and this, in turn, led to turf battles
instead of working cooperatively. In 2001, SRA (the Strategic Rail Authority) was
established, but it turned out to be simply one more layer of bureaucracy [15].
In the British railways, the government did not manage properly before the reform because
of the inadequate government subsidy. Since the reform, the government has had no ability
to regulate the complex system in which there are so many private companies involved.
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Organizational Culture Problems
There were also organizational culture problems. BR had an integrated command structure
like a military organization [15] [16]. However, the radical change under the contracts with
payments and penalties created an adversarial system which did not work. The rapid
change destroyed the existing culture and reduced morale.
Additionally, Railtrack owned the tracks but it did not own the maintenance companies,
and the maintenance companies did not own the companies which actually repaired the
tracks. Railtrack, which had no effective internal engineering, could not supervise the
contractors. Many managers in important positions had no experience in railway
management and they did not understand the business [16]. Railway management must rely
heavily on experience and the lack of management experience was apparent. This was an
example of too much outsourcing causing management problems.
Problems at the Service Level
Because of the successful marketing strategy of TOCs, congestion problems increased after
the reform. For example, chronic congestion on the GNER East Coast line between
Edinburgh and London resulted from the marketing success of the private operating
companies.
In addition to overcrowding on the trains, delays and cancellations were increased by the
reform because of the problems mentioned above. The reform has brought no essential
improvements in the service levels and people suffered from a lower service level.
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4.3.4. Second Reform associated with Railtrack
On October 7, 2001, Railtrack went into insolvency and was sold for E500 million to
Network Rail, a nonprofit private company [15]. There are no stockholders and all the
profit is used for investment. Six directors are overseen by 100-120 specialists from the
railway industry. Network Rail is said to be a renationalization because of its governance
structure. In 2003, Network Rail decided to maintain the tracks internally instead of
outsourcing. Revenue is from the rail usage charge to the TOCs and SRA subsidy. (In 2004,
the charge was E3,164 million and the SRA subsidy was £1,279 million [17]. In 2006, the
subsidy swelled up to E4,600 million. This was partly because of the lack of investment in
maintenance for years.) The debts are kept off the public balance sheet and the government
is repaying the debt. Until 2002, revenue and ridership decreased, and delays and deficit
increased. But recently the system has improved in terms of ridership, performance, and
reliability by increasing subsidies.
This renationalization has not worked well in terms of efficiency. However, the capital
investment on a long term-basis has been improved. The biggest investment project is the
WCML (West Coast Main Line) improvement [17]. It is premature to evaluate the present
organizational structure, but time will tell whether it is successful or not.
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4.3.5. Summary of the U.K. Railway System and its Reform
In the early stage, a true privatization was not achieved because of the distorted value of
BR assets, subsidies and local monopolies. Only private companies got vast profits in this
transition period while there was not much apparent improvement in service.
Additionally for seven years before the second reform in 2001, fatal accidents happened
and finally Railtrack went into insolvency. This failure was because of the inequitable
contracts (unfair access fees caused unbalanced incentives toward capital and maintenance
investment), non-integration of the system, and lack of management ability of each
company and the government.
In 2001, Network Rail began to maintain the rail infrastructure. It was a nonprofit private
company and it received more subsidies than before. The new organization did not have an
advantage in efficiency, but it could invest more for capital and maintenance, and this
increased the safety and on-time performance.
In the next session, international comparison of the railway system will be analyzed, based
on the information in section 4.2 and section 4.3.
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4.4. Comparison of the Railway Systems
Comparing the reforms in Germany, the U.K., and Japan, we find that there have been
common issues associated with these reforms:
Reduction of Political Impact and Correct Decision Making
The reforms we have described in Chapters 2 to 4 reduced to some extent the huge political
impact which existed before the reforms. Political elements led to construction of new lines
and to operating them without considering the profitability of these lines.
In Germany, the establishment of DBAG reduced the politically motivated construction and
operation of unprofitable lines. To avoid political pressures on the DBAG, subsidies are
applied to the construction of unprofitable lines which are in the public interest. Also, the
operation of each line is independently discussed with the local government or federal
government for possible subsidy and some lines are abolished when they are thought to be
unnecessary. Therefore, there is no cross subsidy inside the DBAG and there is less
political intervention. However, this system may include the risk of being too generous to
the DBAG.
On the other hand, in the U.K., too many unprofitable lines were constructed and the
long-term investment in the railway industry was much less than needed before the
privatization. This ruined the railway system and finally, after the reform, the lack of
investment and rapid organizational change has caused the fatal accidents and the collapse
of Railtrack. Nowadays, Network Rail has government control of investment, maintenance,
replacement, and construction of new lines. As a governmental organization, it is hard for it
to avoid political intervention. On the other hand, some of the unprofitable TOCs are
subsidized by OPRAF or PTE for each line. TOCs are selected based on the bidding system.
The budget constraint and the bidding system for the private companies have reduced the
amount of politically-based decision making. However, this system may also include the
risk of being too generous to the TOCs and Network Rail or may result in the lack of
long-term investment because of political intervention through subsidies.
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In Japan, full privatization made the political intervention in the railway industry much less.
However, there is huge cross subsidy inside a private company and it makes the
profitability of each line unclear.
On the other hand, new Shinkansen lines in Japan are subject to political intervention
because these lines are owned by government and are not fully privatized as in Germany
and the U.K.. In this case, the intervention from the government may increase toward these
lines and JR companies need to establish the appropriate relationship between the
government and JR companies. It is clear from the German case that political intervention
can be eliminated by the combination of privatization and financial responsibility. Even
though cross subsidies can cover all the unprofitable lines in Japan now, it is necessary to
determine the profitability of each line and to consider not only whether new lines should
be constructed but also whether unprofitable existing conventional lines should be
abolished.
Competitiveness
It is necessary for the railway industry to have both competition between railway
companies for efficiency and customer-oriented service, and competitiveness with all
transportation modes for its stability.
In the U.K., monopolies are involved to some extent by the bidding strategy and the
government regulation, but there are multiple operators involved in profitable lines. On this
point, competition between railway companies in the U.K. increased the most among the
three countries: there are more than 25 operators involved. However, the competitiveness
worsened a congestion problem of both the number of trains using the tracks and the
number of passengers on trains. It also made the on-time operation unreliable. Government
regulation may solve these problems in the future. On the other hand, competitiveness with
the other transportation modes is maintained by the subsidies to TOCs of the unprofitable
lines and Network Rail, and by the fixed low access fees set by the government. Also, the
increased efficiency from privatization has improved the competitiveness to some extent.
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In Germany, the competition between railway companies is almost nil since most of the
lines are owned and operated by DBAG. But all railway lines are open to any private
companies and there is a potential to increase the competition. The reform followed the
minimum required by EU Directive 91/440/EEC but did not focus on the competition
between railway companies. More effort toward efficiency is necessary for DBAG, but
more competition may not be necessary since reliable on-time operation continues in
Germany. On the other hand, the competitiveness with the other transportation modes was
increased because of the subsidies to new lines in the public interest and local unprofitable
lines, and the unduly low access fees. Subsidies themselves are against the reform policy,
but the clear delineation of financial responsibility made the industry competitive with
other transportation modes.
In Japan, as part of this reform, the government introduced the "Yardstick Competition"7,
which was a competition among geographically separated railway companies. This met
the concern that fierce competition on the same lines would ruin the stability of the railway
service. As a result, there was not much competition involved in Japan. There is some tax
reduction for railway assets, but there are no direct subsidies involved for the original lines.
Competitiveness against other transportation modes has decreased somewhat as new
highways and airports are constructed, but still remains at a higher level than European
countries (Figure 1-1), because of the higher population density in urban areas, road
congestion problems, and high toll charges on the highways. Privatization increased the
railway company's efficiency and stability, and the circumstances in Japan kept the
industry competitive with the other transportation modes. However, new Shinkansen lines,
especially the Hokkaido Shinkansen line, will be more vulnerable to airline competition,
and their situation will be like the German one, where airline service is more popular than
7 "Yardstick Competition" introduces the principle of competition to regional monopoly enterprises
by comparison on the basis of various performance measures to see how well they do, in order to
obtain further efficiency. Thus, they do not really compete with each other. When monopoly
enterprises were not in the same geographical regions and needed more efficiency, some regulators
introduced this "Yardstick competition". The Japanese government has used this method at the
privatization of telecommunication companies.
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in Japan.
To sum up, more increased competition among railway companies would be undesirable
because of its predictable adverse effects such as congestion problems and a lower level of
service. On the other hand, the competitiveness with the other transportation modes is
much more important for the railway industry, whose market is shrinking. For example,
subsidies, government regulations, and closing down of unprofitable lines are involved in
Germany. In Japan, further competitiveness with other transportation can be achieved not
only by restructuring organizations in a company, but also by changed government
regulations on all transportation modes and the restructuring of the total railway network,
which includes the closing down of unprofitable lines.
Transportation and economy in Japan, and environmental issues
These are fundamental reasons that most developed countries keep or develop railways
even though many railways are not as competitive in service or as prosperous as other
transportation modes.
For total coordination of transportation, having the number of modes we now have, but
stronger transportation modes are essential, not only in Japan but also in the U.K. and
Germany. Also the convenience will make the transportation flexible and the economy
stronger.
Additionally, if the business attracts enough ridership, the railway can be much more
efficient than traveling by air or cars. Government officials in the U.K, Germany and Japan
consider that the railways can solve environmental issues, such as emissions of CO 2 and
NO. For example, according to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport in Japan,
CO 2 emitted from a car, bus, or airplane to carry one person for 1km will be 7.5, 3.17 and 5
times as much as CO 2 from a Shinkansen train [7]. The environmental issue is one of the
reasons why many European countries and Asian countries invest in railways even though
some are not profitable.
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Integration of the system
In the U.K., the most radical privatization and the separation of operations occurred with
the reform. It proved to be difficult to integrate all the separated entities, although the U.K.
government tried to have a contract that connected each organization together. A structure
with infrastructure and operations completely separated is very difficult to manage, because
this orients various companies' attitude toward blame rather than toward improvement.
Additionally, the poor management control by the government made the integration worse.
Because there was no incentive for cooperation in this scheme, what was needed was a
governmental organization that would audit and would plan long-term capital investment.
The railway has a public nature and an organization like the Office of Rail Regulator was
supposed to be appropriate. However, the problem was that this organization did not have
sufficient ability to control the situation. To sum up, both an integrated system for the
long-term policy and adequate competition for efficiency are necessary, but with this lack
of adequate government regulation and leadership, the system could not be integrated.
In Germany, the reform followed the minimum requirement of EU Directive 91/440/EEC
and separated infrastructure and operations into different units of DBAG for the financial
accounting system. They focused more on the integrated system in DBAG than the
competition between railway companies [13]. As a result, the reform did not destroy the
integration of the system.
In Japan, the reform split the entire system into several railway companies in different
geographic regions, but the vertical integration between operations and infrastructure was
kept at the same level. There were no integration problems as in the U.K case. However,
the new Shinkansen lines are, or will be, owned by the government and we need to
consider whether there will be any problems associated with the vertical separation
between infrastructure and operations.
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Equitable Contracts
If there is vertical separation between infrastructure and operations, equitable contracts are
one of the key elements for a successful railway system. Equitable contracts should be
considered for the long-term investments in railway infrastructure.
In the U.K., the track asset was owned and maintained by Railtrack, not the operators. The
contracts between TOCs and Railtrack, which included the access fees and liability rules,
did not prove to be equitable. The original access fees were supposed to be equitable to
both operators and Railtrack. However, after the traffic increased, the fixed access fees no
longer provided the contracting parties with proper incentives and finance conditions. The
TOCs had incentives to increase services, but Railtrack had no incentives or budget to
invest in increasing the capacity and in the long-term maintenance plan. Railtrack needed
higher access fees for the capital investment and finally the lack of these funds caused
many delays and accidents. Then, penalties to Railtrack were executed under the
government regulation, but overly severe penalties ruined Railtrack. The vertical separation
made the liability rules difficult and gave less incentive for long-term safety investment.
The fixed charge and liability rules could not cope with the changing circumstances or
provide long-term stability.
In Germany, there are access fees between operators and infrastructure units, but most of
the lines are both operated and owned by DBAG. The access fees are therefore usually
applied to the different units in DBAG for financial accounting. On the whole, the contract
usually exists within the DBAG's accounting and does not have a negative effect on the
long-term investment plan. However, the access fees are based on the reduced reported
value of the DBAG's assets and DBAG may face some investment problems decades later
when the infrastructure has become too old for continued use.
Considering the U.K and Germany cases, contracts should be equitable and flexible enough
for all organizations that are involved in the railway service. Especially if the contract
includes charges, penalties and incentives, these should be fair, precise, and flexible for any
changes of circumstances. Also, contracts should not omit incentives for long-term
investment for safety at all times.
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In Japan, railway lines other than the new Shinkansen lines are vertically integrated
between infrastructure and operation. In this original scheme, there were no contracts
between infrastructure and operating sections. However, in the new Shinkansen scheme,
the assets are or will be owned by the government, and JR companies will operate and
maintain infrastructure or are already doing this. The lease payment will be fixed at an
amount that is almost the same as the incremental profit of the first year's operation. The
government is now considering the additional charge to an operator for the profit that will
be generated in its area by the extension of a new line to another operator's area. This fixed
lease charge may result in unfair contracts in the future when circumstances change, such
as by competition with the air transportation mode. Additionally, there is no framework for
how to deal with the assets after the 30 years of the lease term; there is no rule for the
depreciation expense or the value of the assets after 30 years. In this scheme, it is very
difficult to have equitable contracts between government and JR companies for the
long-term. The contract needs to have valuable, flexible lease payment and to track the
depreciation expense and maintenance cost of JR companies for the accurate evaluation of
the assets. This method will ensure that the contract is equitable and takes long-term
investment into consideration.
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4.5. Summary of the International Comparison
The reform of railway systems in the U.K and Germany was researched, and then these
railway systems were compared with the Japanese railway systems. The common key
factors contributing to success in railway systems are as follows:
* Reduction of political impact and better decision-making on future policies and
regulations
* Competitiveness with other transportation modes
* A strong economy in which transportation is an important factor
* Recognition by government and society that environmental issues are important
and that railways are more environmentally-friendly than other modes
* Integration of the system
* Equitable contracts
These factors are going to be important inputs for the lean enterprise architecting in
Chapter 6. All these issues should be considered concerning the strategy of the enterprise
when architecting the lean enterprise. Now we proceed to Chapter 5 to introduce the lean
enterprise architecting.
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Chapter 5. Concept of the Lean Enterprise Architecting
5.1. What is Lean Enterprise Architecting
According to the Lean Aerospace Initiative, "a lean enterprise is an integrated entity which
efficiently creates value for its multiple stakeholders by employing lean principles and
practices" [18]. The following figure shows the historical industrial paradigm. "Lean" is the
elimination of waste and efficient creation of enterprise value. The early lean message of
1990 emphasized the Lean Production and imitated the Toyota Production System of 1955.
After 1990, the lean message evolved beyond lean production to an extended lean
enterprise which emphasized value added activities in addition to the elimination of waste.
Highly skilled
workforce
Low production rates
High cost
Unskilled labor
High production rates
Low cost
Persistent quality
problems
Inflexible models Low cost
Improving productivity
High quality product
Low cost
Improving productivity
High quality product
Greater value for
stakeholders
Source: Nightingale [18]
Figure 5-1 Historical industrial paradigm and lean enterprise
An enterprise is defined as "one or more persons or organizations that have related
activities, unified operation or common control and common business purpose." (Black's
Law Dictionary, 1999.) There are three different levels of enterprises: Program,
Multi-Program and National or International Level [4]. For example, a multi-program
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enterprise would consist of Boeing, USAF, Lockheed Martin and a national level enterprise
would consist of prime manufacturing companies, suppliers and government. The focus is
expanding now and Figure 5-2 shows the evolution of lean enterprise thinking.
Lean enterprise now requires the integration of process, people, organization, information
and technology and treats an enterprise as a total system taking a holistic view.
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Source: Nightingale [18]
Figure 5-2 Evolution of the Lean Enterprise Concept
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5.2. Introduction of "Enterprise Value Stream Mapping and Analysis"
Within the LAI at MIT, "Enterprise Value Stream Mapping and Analysis (EVSMA)" has
been developed as process for the analysis of the enterprise architecting [5]. This system of
analysis evaluates the value exchange between an enterprise and each stakeholder, the
current process flow, interactions between stakeholders, interactions between processes, the
alignment of strategic objectives, metrics, key processes and stakeholder values. It also
predicts the enterprise degree of waste that exists in a given enterprise. In this thesis, the
process was customized and used to analyze the new high speed rail lines in the railway
industry, which has not been using any of these lean concepts. Based on the EVSMA [5],
important steps were extracted and the analysis follows these steps:
Step 1: Define the Enterprise
Define the enterprise that needs to be analyzed. The definition includes a description of
stakeholders. "A stakeholder is any group or individual who directly or indirectly affects or
is affected by the level of achievement of an enterprise's value creation processes" [19].
Then, set strategic objectives for the enterprise through interviews with company
executives, a study of company reports and general information about the business.
Step 2.1: Current State of the Enterprise: Enterprise Costs
Analyze the cost and the major sources of cost in the enterprise. They are analyzed both in
each process and on the whole in terms of construction cost, budget allocation of the
government, debt, subsidies, lease payment and so forth. This data will be utilized in the
steps that follow.
Step 2.2: Current State of the Enterprise: Value Exchanges
Assess the value exchange between each stakeholder and the enterprise. Various
stakeholders find particular value, worth, or benefit in exchange for their contributions to
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the enterprise. This step will analyze, first, value delivery from the enterprise to a
stakeholder, taking into account relative importance to the stakeholder and current
performance of the enterprise, and second, value delivery from a stakeholder to the
enterprise, considering relative importance to the enterprise and current contribution by the
stakeholder to the enterprise.
The value exchange is well balanced when values can be plotted in terms of the area as
shown in Figure 5-3. If, however, items are actually plotted far above or below that area,
that means too much or little for the stakeholder for a good balance to be achieved and the
balance needs to be improved. This analysis aims to satisfy both the enterprise and all
stakeholders.
Low Relative Importance to Stakeholder High
Figure 5-3 Appropriate position of the value exchange in the lean enterprise
Step 2.3 Current State Perspectives: Value Stream in the Process
To have a desired future enterprise architecture, value creation and elimination of waste in
the processes are fundamental. The value stream mapping was originally used for
eliminating waste to decrease the cost and time of producing products for the demand of
customers in the manufacturing process. In this thesis, we focus not only on the individual
processes but also value creation and elimination of waste in the flow of processes in the
broader enterprise level.
59
Step 2.4 Current State Perspectives: Process Interactions
Analyze current enterprise process performance by looking at the process interactions. In
the process interactions, information, cooperation, and financial resources will be identified,
and each interaction will be analyzed in terms of stability, timeliness, accuracy,
completeness, usefulness, and so on.
Step 2.5: Construct Current-State Perspectives: X-Matrix Evaluation
Evaluate the alignment of strategic objectives, metrics, key processes, and stakeholder
values by using the "X-Matrix" as below. Strategic objectives are from Step 1, stakeholder's
values are from Step 3, and key processes are from Step 4. Enterprise metrics are indexes
that are currently being used to monitor enterprise performance. For example, if the
enterprise is a laboratory, metrics are patents, internal reports and external papers. Then the
evaluation will be started from the upper left quadrant and be moved around the matrix in a
counter-clockwise direction. All the interrelationships of these key areas are evaluated as
below [5]:
* Alignment of metrics with strategic objectives: how the metrics accurately assess the
enterprise performance for strategic objectives;
* Alignment of metrics with key processes: how the metrics are utilized in the enterprise to
measure process performance;
* Alignment of key processes with stakeholder values: how each process delivers the
stakeholder values for the enterprise.
* Alignment of strategic objectives with stakeholder values: how stakeholder values are
represented by the strategic objectives.
Each alignment will be evaluated by indicating blue for strong, orange for weak, or white
for no interaction. Numbers of weak, strong, and total interactions in the row or column are
shown by the numbers outside the edge of the grids.
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Source: Nightingale [18]
Figure 5-4 Sample of X-Matrix
Step 3 : Future-State Vision
Describe the future-state lean enterprise vision for approximately five years. It is necessary
to give consideration to all the results from Steps 1 to 2 and optimize them: well-balanced
value possession by enterprise and stakeholders, less waste, productive interactions,
emphasis on critical processes and functions. It would also be worth drawing a new value
stream map of the future enterprise, based on a comparison with the old one.
Step 4: Transformation Plan
Prioritize areas of focus to the potential opportunities for significant improvement, and
cope with any barriers. Then describe the transition plan, how the enterprise can change
from the current state to the lean one in Step 3. This transition plan can be used by
enterprise executives or managers to pursue the goals of the envisioned lean enterprise.
In this chapter, the concept of lean enterprise architecting was introduced. Now we will
utilize this framework for the new Shinkansen project in Japan in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6. Lean Enterprise Architecting of New Shinkansen
Projects in Japan
6.1. Introduction to the Enterprise of New Shinkansen Projects
Definition of the Enterprise
In this thesis, the enterprise is a high speed railway industry, especially for the new
Shinkansen project in which the Shinkansen lines are expanding under the leadership of
government. The enterprise consists of a large and varied number of stakeholders (Figure
6-1). This is because the leadership role of the government is extremely high and the
enterprise should be led from the national level.
Central Goverment
Government Organization
Legislators; Politicians
JRTT
Local Government Passenger Operators
District 1 Operator 1
District 2 Operator 2
Enterprise:
Infrastructure SuPuhers Exeso fteNwFreightOperator
Construction Companies Exeso fteNwJR Freight
Shinkansen Project
Rolling Stock Manufacturers
Citiens axpaers --'Manufacturing Companies
Investors .
Airline Indut - Customers Society at largeAirlie IndstryEnvironmental Issues
Figure 6-1 The New Shinkansen Enterprise and its stakeholders
The following table identifies each stakeholder group of the enterprise. (Refer to Section
6.2.3) Note that in each group, there are also many indirect stakeholders who are important
for the success of each stakeholder group and the enterprise, but do not directly interact
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with the enterprise. Therefore, in this thesis, these indirect stakeholders are included in the
discussion of some of the direct stakeholder groups.
Table 6-1 Stakeholders of the New Shinkansen Enterprise
Stakeholder Stakeholders Description
Group
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Leadership of the enterprise
Transport
Ministry of Public Management, Home Liaison to local government
Central Affairs, Postal and Telecommunications
Government Ministry of Finance In charge of finance
(Leadership Legislators, especially Politicians in Ruling Party Politics and Adjustment
of the enterprise) ruling parties Meetings affecting the newShinkansen law
JRTT Owner of construction
Owner of the infrastructure
Control of lease contract
Local Local governments of districts which the Investor
Government new Shinkansen serves. Future owner of conventional lines
parallel to new Shinkansen lines.
Politicians Ruling parties affect the project
(Passenger Rail) Infrastructure Divisions Each operator serves a particular
Operators Operating Divisions region. Trains will operate through
Other divisions between regions and operators.
Labor Unions
Freight Rail JR Freight Contract affects the freight rail
Operator operators.
Rolling Stock Manufacturing Companies of Rolling Competitive Market
Stock New technologies involved
Manufacturer
Infrastructure Construction Companies Bidding System involved
Supplier Cost Reduction
Customers Future passengers
Citizens Taxpayers Indirect Investors
Society at large Japanese Society Transportation Functions:
Capacity and Flexibility
Environmental Issues for both
passenger and freight
transportation
Competitors Airline Industry Not a stakeholder but affecting this
enterprise.
Source of Format: Nightingale [18]
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Strategic Objectives
Based on the general characteristics of railways and high-speed railways and the
international comparison of the British, German, and Japanese railways, the strategic
objectives of the enterprise should be the following:
Strategic Objective 1: Strengthening of transportation and economy in Japan, and
tackling of environmental issues
These are fundamental reasons for Japan to keep or develop railways, even though many
railway lines are not as competitive on service or as economical as other transportation
modes. Based on the total coordination of transportation, additional transportation modes
are essential for Japan. Also the transportation flexibility will increase the convenience and
make the economy stronger.
Additionally, if the business attracts enough ridership, the railway can be much more
efficient than traveling by air or cars. Environmental concern is one of the reasons why
many European and Asian countries are investing in railways even though some are not
profitable.
Strategic Objective 2: Make the level of service and safety high on a long-term basis
It is also necessary to have a high level of service and safety on a long-term basis. Level of
service can be characterized by reasonable fares, frequent trains, reduced travel time, and
reliable schedules.
Strategic Objective 3: Increase the competitiveness in relation to other transportation
modes
Competitiveness of the railway with other transportation modes is very important for
making the railway industry prosper, since railways have been losing modal share for
decades.
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Strategic Objective 4 : Integration of the total system
To achieve strategic objectives 2 and 3, a railway has to have an integrated total system that
is based on the cooperative relationship among stakeholders. Especially for the railway
industry, safety and competitiveness with other transportation modes can be enhanced by
this integration.
Strategic Objective 5 : Reduction of political intervention
To achieve strategic objectives, 1, 2, and 3, it is necessary to have a process for accurate
decision making as to whether or not we need each of the new Shinkansen projects.
Appropriate selection of lines to be constructed and concentration on a manageable number
of construction projects is essential for better utilization of assets and budget.
Strategic Objective 6 : Equitable contracts and regulation
To achieve strategic objectives 2 to 5, equitable contracts and regulation are critical for
railway operation, especially when operation and infrastructure are separated. The process
of pursuing equitable contracts and regulation also needs to continue even after the
operation begins, so as to make small but important adjustments possible.
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6.2. Current State of the Enterprise
6.2.1. Background and Necessity for Lean Enterprise Architecting
Background
Under the traditional management structure, six private companies (JR companies) have
owned infrastructure and operated in their geographic territories. Under this scheme, the
management role of the government has been extremely low. By contrast, in the extension
railway lines in the new Shinkansen projects, the role of government is high since the new
Shinkansen lines are owned by government although they are operated and maintained by
private companies. The extension also requires mutual operation with the neighboring
district and a complicated relationship between freight railway and passenger railway
companies (Refer to Section 6.2.3, "Freight Railway Company").
Additionally, financial issues complicate the enterprise. Because the new Shinkansen
project needs huge capital investment for the construction and each of the stakeholders has
different values, the project may not be adequately integrated and a lot of waste and risk
may result.
Although the new Shinkansen project has potential to increase the ridership and revenue,
the enterprise must also face other difficulties. First, the number of people in Japan is
decreasing, which means the number of customers is decreasing. Second, these lines will
face fierce competition with the airline industry because people will tend to use air for the
longer distances from Tokyo to the new line destinations. Success of any mode of
transportation depends on frequency, travel time, fare and accessibility of all modes. The
critical problem is that there is no coordination among the highway, airline and railway
industries for the new Shinkansen projects in Japan. This coordination is necessary to have
stability since both railway and airline industries are economy of scale businesses. In this
aspect, the role of the government has a huge impact on each industry.
With the extension project of new Shinkansen lines and the increased complexity of the
circumstances described above, the need for coordination is more prominent than before.
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Necessity for the New Lean Enterprise Architecting for the New Shinkansen Pro jects
Because of the complexity of the new Shinkansen enterprise, it is necessary to have a broad
view of the whole enterprise and to design collaborative relationships within the enterprise.
However, the enterprise of the newly extended Japanese high-speed rail industry is not a
lean enterprise. There are many stakeholders involved. While each stakeholder or
organization has good internal planning, improvement and development, there is a need for
integration and planned coordination to ensure the stability and the future success of the
whole railway industry.
The lean concept is expanding from the production lines to the whole enterprise level
within the aerospace and airline industry in the U.S., which is now trying to achieve it
through LAI [4]. In the aerospace industry in the U.S, many stakeholders are involved and
this situation created no problems when there was a huge demand and a large budget.
However, budgets have tightened since the cold war ended and competition among airline
companies has become more fierce [4]. The LAI is exploring ways to improve the
enterprise architecture of the aerospace industry and the same approach can be applied to
the new Shinkansen enterprise.
In fact, the new Shinkansen enterprise needs huge investment. However, there is only a
small portion of government budget available for the new Shinkansen project and it is very
hard for the government to increase it. (Refer to 6.2.2) When we are in an era of high
growth, there is plenty of capital and the construction can proceed easily. However, Japan is
just recovering from recession, and lean enterprise architecture [4] is necessary to utilize its
limited resources to maximize the positive impact on the economy and environmental
issues.
Lean enterprise architecting [18] enables an enterprise to achieve greater efficiency and
effectiveness in total. When many stakeholders are involved and budgets are extremely
limited, integrated planning by all stakeholders is necessary to reduce risks and the waste of
investment. Appropriate lean enterprise architecture should enable the railway industry to
be more efficient, stable and prosperous. In this thesis, the EVSMA analysis and future
vision will be implemented.
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6.2.2. Analysis of Enterprise Costs
Budget and Cost at the National Level
The process of the construction of new Shinkansen was decided by government and the
ruling parties.
In the national expenditure, Figure 6-2 shows the budget allocation. As a result of the
central government decision, the budget for the new Shinkansen Project in 2005 was Y70.6
billion, which is a small portion of the total national expenditure of Y82 trillion.
Furthermore, the whole budget allocation for public works projects was Y7.4 trillion and
the budget allocation for road maintenance and construction was Y1.7 trillion in 2005. This
shows that the central government focuses more on road construction rather than railroad
development.
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Figure 6-2 Budget Allocation of the national expenditure [102 million yen] in 2005
However, this does not simply mean the government should increase the expenditure for
the new Shinkansen project. Japanese government finance now relies heavily on bonds
(42 % of total general revenue, Y34.4 trillion in 2005) and the outstanding balance of local
and central government bonds is Y770 trillion, which is 152.8 % of the GDP in 2005 (Figure
6-3), while the outstanding balances of local and central government in Germany, U.K,
France, Canada and the U.S are between 50 and 80 % of their annual GDP [21].
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Considering this severe fiscal circumstance, the budget allocation of national expenditure
for the new Shinkansen project may decline in the future.
Source: Ministry of Finance Japan [20]
Figure 6-3 Government general revenue [102 million yen] in 2005
Budget and Cost at the Enterprise Level
The total amount of the new Shinkansen budget for local and central governments was
Y219.5 billion in 2005. Table 6-2 shows the 2005 budget allocation for the new Shinkansen
project.
Table 6-2 Budget Allocation for New Shinkansen Project in 2005 [in billion yen]
Government(146.3) Local Government (73.2)
72.4 (a) 70.6 (b) 3.3 (c) 71.5 (d) 1.65 (e)
Source: Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport [7]
(a) Financial resource based on a portion of JR companies' amortization payment for the
acquisition of existing Shinkansen lines in 1991
(b) Budget allocation of public works projects by the central government
(c) Debt secured by the portion of (a) which will be paid from 2013 to 2017. (The total
principal payment is Y330 billion)
(d) Budget allocation of public work project by local government
(e) Additional budget allocation by local government (half of the amount of (c))
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The debt was added in 2005 by government decision and is secured by the portion of (a)
which will be paid from 2013 to 2017. (The total principal payment is 330 billion yen).
This total amount will be allocated to each area under construction. Even though there will
be future interest payments of Y35 billion on this debt, the total estimated cost still exceeds
the total budget by Y200 billion. This decision was made for the following reasons. [22]
(The total construction cost for the construction sites is V1 170 billion)
* A smaller budget allocation will lengthen the construction term. This debt is the
only way to make the opening earlier. Earlier opening makes the asset utilization
efficient.
* At least Y145 billion of cost reduction will be made by the improvement of the
construction method.
* An additional Y2 billion of national expenditure and Y1 billion of local
government expenditure is planned to cover the shortage in the budget. This
means that the citizens will have the burden of this portion.
After the construction, the amount of lease payment per year is determined by and is within
the profit from the new line and operators will pay this fixed amount for 30 years.
Construction cost, length and lease payment for each newly constructed section is shown in
Table 6-3. In this scheme, the lease payment will determine how central government can
collect the money for construction cost which was covered by national expenditure.
Additionally, if the new line is profitable enough, this system allows the central
government to have enough budget for further construction. Actually, in terms of the
Nagano Shinkansen line between Takasaki and Nagano, the lease payment is a fairly big
amount in comparison to the construction cost. In this way, the estimation of demand and
the lease contract will affect the recovery of past national expenditure and the future
projects.
On the other hand, the burden of the local government is approximately 18 % of the total
construction cost. As mentioned before, total budget of the local government is 1/3 of the
total construction cost. But there is a local allocation tax grant that will cover half of the
repayment of the bond issued for the 90 % of the total budget of the local government. (The
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local government will repay the bond for 20 -30 years.) At any rate, it is clear that local
government is also one of the big stakeholders in this project. In other words, this project
has to satisfy not only operators and central government, but also the local government as
well.
Table 6-3 Construction Cost, length and lease payment for each newly constructed area
Lease Lease
Operation Construction
Construction Cost (30 (one
Length Cost/km
years) year)
Central Local
Total
Government Government
Morioka - Hachinohe 3200 1600 4800 96.6 49.7 2379 79.3
Hachinohe - Aomori 3067 1533 4600 81.8 56.2 2100 70
Aomori - Hakodate 2800 1400 4200 148 28.4 - -
Hakodate - Sapporo 7400 3700 11100 212 52.4 - -
Aomori - Sapporo 10200 5100 15300 360 42.5 - -
Takasaki - Nagano 5616 2808 8424 117.4 71.8 5250 175
Nagano - Joetsu 2000 1000 3000 59.7 50.3 2400 80
Joetsu - Kanazawa 165 - 9750 325
Nagano - Fukui 15300 7650 22950 301.4 76.1 13000 433.33
Fukushima - Interest Free Loan to JR
87.1 3.7 - -
Yamagata East: 320
Interest Free Loan to
Yamagata - Shinjo - 61.5 4.6 - -
JR East: 280
Interest Free Loan to
Morioka - Akita - 127.3 5.2 - -
JR East: 660
Source: Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport [7]
(*) Nagano-Fukui includes the section of Nagano-Joetsu, Joetsu-Kanazawa, and Kanazawa-Fukui.
(*)Total Line Length of JR East is 7538 krn. Of this, 1053 line-km are Shinkansen.
(*)Costs are given in 102 million yen.
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Revenue and Cost at the Operation Level
Population in Japan and the revenue from railway operation is decreasing slowly every year.
(Figure 6-4 and Figure 6-5 show the revenue from railway, Shinkansen, and other
businesses in JR East.) On the other hand, the revenue from other business has increased
every year and the total consolidated revenue has been at almost the same level since JR
East has been focusing on further efficiency in the railway business and diversifying
businesses to increase profit. However, the growth rate of profit from other business has
been decreasing recently, and the Japanese government has decided to raise the fixed asset
tax rate on space in stations that is used by other business from one third of the normal
fixed asset tax rate to the full rate that is applied to out of station space. If this decision is
implemented, the revenue from non-railway businesses in stations will decrease and JR
East will need to focus more on the railway business.
Revenue from railway lines other than Shinkansen is decreasing because of the decline in
the population (and therefore in the number who commute to work) and the increasing
share of cars as the transportation mode. On the other hand, 25% of the revenue in the
railway business is from the Shinkansen and the revenue has not been decreasing in the
way that other railway revenue has been in the past 10 years.8
30000
25000 -
20000 - -
E Other Business
15000 - - - - Other Railway
El Shinkansen
10000 - - - -
5000 -
0
1990 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
Source: JR East [9]
Figure 6-4 Revenue from railway, Shinkansen, and other businesses [in 108 Yen]
8 Also, the average passenger-trip length (km) has been steadily increasing.
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Source: JR East [9]
Figure 6-5 The revenues of each business in JR East in 2005 [in 108 Yen]
In this tight situation, appropriate new Shinkansen projects that will attract people and
increase ridership are necessary for operators to avoid further decline in the Japanese
railway industry even though the new Shinkansen projects are determined by political
issues. Once appropriate new Shinkansen lines are constructed, the revenue from
Shinkansen will be much more than 25% of railway business revenue, and the projects also
have the potential favorable effect of attracting people to railway service and thereby
increasing the ridership on other lines.
However, this does not mean that every proposed extension of the Shinkansen is desirable.
Shinkansen business is very important in the financial results of operators now and an
inappropriate extension will ruin the present good financial condition of the operating
railway company. Table 6-4 shows the operating revenue, expense and profit of Shinkansen
and conventional-line service in JR East. Shinkansen service is now fairly profitable while
conventional-line railway service is not as profitable as the Shinkansen service. This is
because the conventional lines include many unprofitable lines in rural areas and there is a
cross subsidy between rural and urban areas in JR East. In JR Central, more than 80 % of
revenue is from Shinkansen business. In this situation, no matter how political intervention
is involved in the projects, new Shinkansen lines should be profitable instead of requiring a
new cross-subsidy from other lines to the new lines, and should be independent from the
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government since the operating profit from Shinkansen service has a huge impact on the
corporate finance of operators.
Table 6-4 Operating Revenue, expense and profit of Shinkansen and conventional lines
in JR East in 2005 [in 102 million yen]
Operating Revenue Operating Expense Operating Profit
Shinkansen Service 4824 2900 1924
Conventional line service 13366 12117 1249
Source: JR East [10]
Summary of the Analysis of Cost Factors
Following is the short summary of the factors that affect costs. These will be
discussed in the later analysis.
* The budget of national expenditure is very limited because of the huge amount of
government issued bonds and its policy.
* Lease contracts are a key factor for long-term success of the project.
* Local governments are important stakeholders as investors.
* How much the central government receives for its investment is determined by the lease
payment, which means that the lease payment affects the burden of Japanese people for
the construction.
* Under the very limited budget, the key factor is the profitability of the new lines.
* Budget allocation and responsibility for the projects are very complicated.
* Shinkansen business now has a very important role in the financial situation of operators.
If the choice of construction and lease contract is inappropriate, it will ruin the operators
which have been successful since the restructuring in 1987.
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6.2.3. Stakeholders' Value and Value Exchanges
Each stakeholder expects particular worth, utility, benefit, or reward in exchange for its
respective contributions to the enterprise. In this section, value exchange between the
enterprise and each stakeholder will be identified with its importance and performance
level. Additionally, based on value exchange analysis, we will compare how well each
stakeholder satisfies its values.
Note that the following analysis is based on the information gathered in Chapters 1 to 5 and
the analysis may be different from researcher to researcher since it is hard to be quantitative.
However, it does provide incentives to change the enterprise into a lean one.
Customers
Customers are the future passengers who will use the new Shinkansen Lines. High speed
rail will be used by many Japanese people, and most of them will not be regular commuters
on the Shinkansen.
Table 6-5 shows the value exchange between customers and the enterprise. The following
figures show, first, value delivery from the enterprise to customers by relative importance
to customers and current performance of the enterprise, and second, value delivery from
customers to the enterprise by relative importance to the enterprise and current contribution
by customers to the enterprise.
The major values of customers are safe, reliable service and reasonable fare. Users care
more about safety and its technology than about improvement in speed. However, where
there is competition with air transportation, a customer may consider that the speed of
travel is also important for the choice of the transportation mode. Additionally, the current
contribution of the customers to the enterprise for ridership and profitability of the lines can
be changed by future potential demand and the competition with air transportation.
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Table 6-5 "Value Exchange" between Customers and the Enterprise
Value that customers expect from the Stakeholders Value contributed to the enterprise by
enterprise customers
# Safety Customers # Ridership and profitability
# Reliability Future Long-term stability
# Frequency Passengers
# Reasonable fare
# Speed
Source of Format: EVSMA 1.0 for LAI member use only [23]
Safety
Reliabiity
Frequency
Reasonable
Fare
Low Relative Importance to Customers High
Source of Format: EVSMA 1.0 for LAI member use only [24]
Figure 6-6 "Value Delivery" from the Enterprise to Customers: Relative Importance to Customers
and Current Performance of the Enterprise
Unknown now
Relative Importance to the Enterprise High
Source of Format: EVSMA 1.0 for LAI member use only [24]
Figure 6-7 "Value Delivery" from Customers to the Enterprise: Relative Importance to the
Enterprise and Current Contribution by Customers to the Enterprise
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Citizens
Citizens are stakeholders who pay taxes for the national expenditures and they are the
indirect investors for the project. As taxpayers, they expect the least national expenditure
for the enterprise. Japanese people usually do not have a positive view of the construction
of new Shinkansen lines since this may require more national expenditure that comes from
taxes that they pay. A relatively small number of people along the lines are pleased about
the construction since it will benefit them most.
Table 6-6 shows the value exchange between citizens and the enterprise. The following
figures show first, value delivery from the enterprise to citizens by relative importance to
citizens and current performance of the enterprise, and second, value delivery from citizens
to the enterprise by relative importance to the enterprise and current contribution by
citizens to the enterprise.
Table 6-6 "Value Exchange" between Citizens and the Enterprise
Value that citizens expect from the Stakeholders Value contributed to the enterprise by citizens
enterprise
# Less prior investment Citizens # Indirect prior investment through tax
# Lower financial burden Japanese # Opinions through mass media or politicians
# Increased transportation modes People who (Most of the citizens are negative if the lease
# Better environmental quality pay taxes payment will not covet the national expenditure
well. The government should understand this fact. )
Source of Format: EVSMA 1.0 for LAI member use only [23]
0 Increased Transportation
Modes Unknown now
Better Environmental
---------- Quality ---------------------- -
Less Prior Less Financial
Investment Burden
Low Relative Importance to Citizens High
Source of Format: EVSMA 1.0 for LAI member use only [24]
Figure 6-8 "Value Delivery" from the Enterprise to Citizens: Relative Importance to Citizens and
Current Performance of the Enterprise
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Source of Format: EVSM1A 1.0 for LAI member use only [24]
Figure 6-9 "Value Delivery" from Citizens to the Enterprise: Relative Importance to the
Enterprise and Current Contribution by Citizens to the Enterprise
Society at Large
Society at large is Japanese society which is concerned about the big picture, economical
and environmental issues. Government opinions must include this societal point of view.
Table 6-7 shows the value exchange between society at large and the enterprise. The
following figures show, first, value delivery from the enterprise to society at large by
relative importance to society at large and current performance of the enterprise, and
second, value delivery from society at large to the enterprise by relative importance to the
enterprise and current contribution by society at large to the enterprise.
From the point of view of society as a whole, total coordination of freight and passenger
rail is very important. However, although the contract involves the paralleling conventional
lines which continue to be used by JR Freight, the enterprise tends to consider passenger
rail, the Shinkansen, without regard to the issues of freight rail. This process lowers the
quality of the choice of conventional lines whose operation will be transferred to local
government. The enterprise should not shrink the freight rail market. (refer to section 6.2.3
"Freight Rail Operator")
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Table 6-7 "Value Exchange" between Society at Large and the Enterprise
Value that society at large expects from the Stakeholders Value contributed to the enterprise by
enterprise society at large
# Better environmental quality and fuel Society at
efficiency large # Better Selection of the projects
-- Freight Rail vs Trucks (CO 2 and NOx) Japanese according to environmental, energy,
-- Shinkansen vs Air Transportation society, and economic points of view
(CO 2 and NOx)
# Better economic situation for society along the Societal # Better selection and contracting from
lines point of view the environmental and economical
-- Attract people and companies to the region point of view of OnVentional 1ines for
-- Increased employment which operation will be transferred to
-- Tax revenue
# Increase in transportation modes
-- Stability of transportation in Japan
Source of Format: EVSMA 1.0 for LAI member use only [23]
Increase in
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Better Environmental
Quality and Fuel
Efficiency
--Shinkansen
Unknown
- Better Economic ----------
Situation
Relative Importance to the Society at I
Better Environmental
Quality and Fuel
Efficiency
-- Freight
arge High
Source of Format: EVSMA 1.0 for LAI member use only [24]
Figure 6-10 "Value Delivery" from the Enterprise to Society at Large: Relative Importance to
Society at Large and Current Performance of the Enterprise
Better Selection an
Contractingof Transft
Conventional Line
Relative Importance to the Enterprise High
Figure 6-11
Source of Format: EVSMA 1.0 for LAI member use only [24]
"Value Delivery" from Society at Large to the Enterprise: Relative Importance to
the Enterprise and Current Contribution by Society at Large to the Enterprise
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Central Government
This stakeholder group consists of the government ministries, legislators, and JRTT. The
government ministries and the ruling parties have decision making authority for the new
Shinkansen project. The central government enacted the new Shinkansen law to develop
both the national and the local economy, expanding the living area by linking major cities
with high speed rail which operates at speeds more than 200 km/h [7]. For this
national-level project, this stakeholder group, the central government, is a strong promoter
of the projects.
However, the central government is also greatly affected by political intervention. The new
Shinkansen law and important decision making concerning contracts was determined by
consultations with the government and ruling parties. Since politicians are greatly involved
in these projects, the decision making process has a high level of political intervention.
An independent administrative legal entity, JRTT (Japan Railway Construction, Transport
and Technology Agency), is usually appointed as the leader for construction by the Minister
of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. Many executives in JRTT are from the central
government [25] and we can guess that JRTT is highly affected by the central government.
This is the domain of central government, especially the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure
and Transport. For the construction, JRTT outsources to private companies. The contracts
between JRTT and construction companies will determine the terms, quality, and cost.
When it has a construction budget from government planning, JRTT will negotiate with
construction companies [7]. There is a bidding system before construction. After the
construction, JRTT will have a lease contract with operators negotiated by the government.
JRTT will own the assets for 30 years.
In this scheme, the governmental ministry, JRTT, and legislators (politicians) can be in one
group of stakeholders since they support the same policy, even though they are supposed to
be organizations that can contend with each other.
Their policy is to promote the new Shinkansen lines. However, in the total public budget
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(7531 billion yen), Y1699 billion of the public budget is spent on roads and Y7 billion,
which is only 0.1 %, on the new Shinkansen Project (Figure 6-2). Additionally, part of the
Y7 billion is from the lease payments for other leased Shinkansen lines. This suggests that
the central government is not placing priority on the construction of the new Shinkansen
lines. With other financial resources, the central government was able to adopt the
pay-as-you-go method for the new Shinkansen projects and finally covered its 2/3 of the
total construction cost every year (Table 6-2). However, a big portion of the total payment
will be financed by JR companies' lease payments for 30 years. The central government
decreases the financial risk of operators by its huge capital investment for new Shinkansen
lines, but it does not intend to allocate the budget as a subsidy to operators, but rather to
collect as much as possible from the operation revenue. This vague method was used
because the central government desired to have new lines, yet there was the huge amount
of issued government bonds.
Additionally, the opening of each new Shinkansen line will not be early enough to utilize
the assets quickly, since the central government has allocated only a small portion of its
budget to each line of the new Shinkansen projects. The long construction term reduces the
total revenue period since the asset will become old as time goes by and it will generate
revenue only after all of the line is constructed. The government has expanded the projects
too much, given the tight budget, and has recently decided to have the debt secured by the
financial resource from future repayment of JR companies for existing Shinkansen lines
between 2013 and 2017.
In 2005, the ruling parties of the government began to consider that "the lease payments
within the benefit" should include the increased profit of the existing Shinkansen lines
which will be generated by increased ridership caused by the extension of new Shinkansen
lines. For example, the government expects $390 million/year from the construction of the
Hokuriku Shinkansen and $220 million/year from the Hokkaido Shinkansen, which are
incremental benefits from existing lines caused by the extension of the Shinkansen lines
[22].
Especially for the Hokkaido Shinkansen line, the central government wants to cover not
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only the construction cost but also the costs for the 53.8 km tunnel under the sea which
connects Honshu and Hokkaido islands. This tunnel was built by the government, and the
cost was high enough that it cannot be profitable. The government retains ownership of
the tunnel and only leases it to JR Hokkaido. The lease payment is based only on the tax
and administration expense and will not cover the depreciation expense of the asset.
Additionally, a huge maintenance cost is anticipated in the future. The new line includes
this tunnel and it is reasonable that the government wants to gain an additional lease charge
for this section.
In general, ruling parties and government organizations want to promote the construction,
but the huge debt that the government owes undercuts the project. In this situation, it is
natural that the central government tries to extract as much money from operators for the
resource as possible to help it expedite and complete the construction.
Table 6-8 shows the value exchange between the central government and the enterprise.
The following figures show, first, value delivery from the enterprise to the central
government by relative importance to the central government and current performance of
the enterprise, and second, value delivery from the central government to the enterprise by
relative importance to the enterprise and current contribution by the central government to
the enterprise.
Central and local governments take it for granted that operators have a reliable, safe service
with fixed price; they expect the same level under the regulation as before and they focus
more on the financial issues. To expedite the construction despite such a tight budget and
minimize criticism of the project, the government wants to reduce its budgetary burden.
Therefore, the lease contract with JR companies will be one of the critical issues for the
government. Adding more projects is the most important goal for the politicians, but not for
the whole group of stakeholders.
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Table 6-8 Value Exchange between the Central Government and the Enterprise
Value that the central government Stakeholders Value contributed to the enterprise by the central
expect from the enterprise government
# Political benefit Central # Total coordination of transportation
# Better economic situation Government modes
-- Rise in tax payments # Accurate investigation and analysis from
-- Public satisfaction Ministry of envi-ronmental, energy, economic-poipts of view
# Better environmental quality and Land, for decision making about the selection of lines
fuel efficiency Infrastructure
# Increase in transportation modes and Transport, # Justification of the projects
--Stability of transportation in Japan Ministry of
# Profitability of the line Public # Budget for construction
# Lease payments from operators Management,
-- Less burden of expense Ministry of # Leadership
# Higher speed Finance,
# Reliable and sustainable service legislators # Better selection and contracting from the
# Safety (politicians), enyironmental and economic points of view of
JRTT conventional lines whose operation will be
transferred to local government
Source of Format: EVSMA 1.0 for LAI member use only [23]
Environmental Quality Political
Increased and Fuel Efficiency Benefit
Transportation Modes --for Shinkansen
Reliable Service,
Safety Unknown
4 Lease Payment
Speed Better Economic
Situation
Environmental Quality
and Fuel Efficiency
--for Freight
Low Relative Importance to the Central Government High
Source of Format: EVSMA 1.0 for LAI member use only [24]
Figure 6-12 "Value Delivery" from the Enterprise to the Central Government: Relative
Importance to the Central Government and Current Performance of the Enterprise
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Figure 6-13 "Value Delivery" from the Central Government to the Enterprise: Relative
Importance to the Enterprise and Current Contribution by the Central Government
to the Enterprise
Local Government
A local government is a stakeholder group that expects to have a new Shinkansen Line in
its area. The objective of a local government is that the Shinkansen will improve the
economic situation in its local area, and that politicians in the area will reap greater support
from the residents if the construction is undertaken. In spite of the tough financial situation
nationwide, the population in local areas is decreasing and local governments need policies
to stop this trend and to help the declining local economies.
Local governments have hired consultants to do research promoting the Shinkansen
extension projects. The decision should not be based only on their opinions since they are
the stakeholder group that wants to have the extension and the research tends to be
optimistic about the future customer base and to include many assumptions. For example,
some prefectures insist that the increased revenue from taxes after the construction and the
lease payment by JR companies will make a profit for the central government [26]. Local
governments urge the central government to construct the new Shinkansen lines and to
allocate funds for the construction. However, the analysis of the economic impact includes
questionable assumptions since it is unclear how new Shinkansen lines will attract people
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and companies. Transition from air mode to rail mode does not affect the local economy,
which needs to attract more people. Careful investigation will be necessary for the
justification.
Additionally, as mentioned in the cost analysis, they will still have to repay 18 % of the
total construction cost even though some portion of the debt will be repaid by the local
allocation tax grant. They will also have to operate unprofitable lines in which JR
companies transfer to the local government assets and operations paralleled by the
extended Shinkansen lines. This transition of assets and operations will worsen the local
budgetary situation.
What it comes down to is that local governments are eager to have the new Shinkansen
lines, but this business has a high financial risk and may result in a low return. Therefore,
careful and equitable, unbiased analysis is necessary for the decision making about the new
Shinkansen lines.
Table 6-9 shows the value exchange between local government and the enterprise. The
following figures show, first, value delivery from the enterprise to local government by
relative importance to local government and current performance of the enterprise, and
second, value delivery from local government to the enterprise by relative importance to
the enterprise and current contribution by local government to the enterprise.
Table 6-9 Value Exchange between Local Government and the Enterprise
Value that local government expects Stakeholders Value contributed to the enterprise by local
from the enterprise government
# Political benefit Local # Justification of the project
# Better economic situation in the future Government -for selection of the location
-- Rise in tax payments for rapid construction with sufficient budget
-- Public satisfaction # Budget for construction
# Lower financial burden # Accurate demand analysis for decision making
# Higher speed about the construction
# Reliable service # Better operation of transferred conventional
# Safety lines
# Relationship with freight rail
Source of Format: EVSMA 1.0 for LAI member use only [23]
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6-14 "Value Delivery" from the Enterprise to Local Government: Relative
Importance to Local Government and Current Performance of the Enterprise
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Source of Format: EVSMA 1.0 for LAI member use only [24]
Figure 6-15 "Value Delivery" from Local Government to the Enterprise: Relative
Importance to the Enterprise and Current Contribution by Local Government
to the Enterprise
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Passenger Rail Operators
In Japan, passenger rail operators are in charge of passenger rail operations and
maintenance of infrastructure and rolling stock. In terms of the value relation to such a big
project, employees, shareholders, labor unions, and the company have almost the same
interest and we can represent these stakeholders as operators. Also, the new Shinkansen
lines will include mutual operations and multiple operators are involved.
For the decision making process, government proposals need to be approved by operators.
One of the reasons why JNR broke up was the reckless construction of railways by the
decisions of government and politicians. This approval process is supposed to avoid such
reckless construction being mandated by the politicians. Profitability of the operation is
definitely necessary to succeed in the new Shinkansen project.
In terms of the construction cost, operators want to minimize the risk of having too much
debt and a negative impact on their finances. Consequently, they expect their investment
for maintenance and replacement and operation costs to be covered by the future revenue.
Another important value for operators is stability and profitability of the service. Stability
includes enough generated cash flow for the future increased maintenance expenditure. In
other words, operators are expecting more cash flow from the line to invest for the safety
and future maintenance plan, since maintenance cost will rise as the infrastructure gets old.
Also, as private companies, operators expect more profit in exchange for the longer service.
As a result, the lease contract between operators and central government has a very
important role in the value exchange about the financial issues.
Table 6-10 shows the value exchange between passenger rail operators and the enterprise.
The following figures show, first, value delivery from the enterprise to passenger rail
operators by relative importance to passenger rail operators and current performance of the
enterprise, and second, value delivery from passenger rail operators to the enterprise by
relative importance to the enterprise and current contribution by passenger rail operators to
the enterprise.
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Table 6-10 Value Exchange between Passenger Rail Operators and the Enterprise
Value that passenger rail operators expect Stakeholders Value contributed to the enterprise by
from the enterprise passenger rail operators
# Stable, sustainable operation Passenger # Safety
# Lower lease payment (Less cost burden) Rail # Reliability
# Profitability of the operation Operators # Stable, sustainable operation
# Reasonable fare regulation # Lease payments from operators mean
# Total coordination of transportation modes JR East less construction burden for the enterprise
-- Between air and rail JR Central # Higher speed
JR West |# Approval of selected lines and contracts
JR Hokkaido # Customer-oriented operation
JR Kyushu
Source of Format: EVSMA 1.0 for LAI member use only [23]
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Figure 6-16 "Value Delivery" from the Enterprise to Passenger Rail Operators: Relative
Importance to Passenger Rail Operators and Current Performance of the Enterprise
Safety
Reliable Service
a Lease Paymnt Sustainable Operatn
a Spee3 _ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ __ _ Customner-orientd
pOperation
U
Approval of Selected Lines
and Cntracts
U
Low Relative Importance to the Enterprise High
Source of Format: EVSMA 1.0 for LAI member use only [24]
Figure 6-17 "Value Delivery" from Passenger Rail Operators to the Enterprise: Relative
Importance to the Enterprise and Current Contribution by Passenger Rail
Operators to the Enterprise
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Rolling Stock Manufacturers
Development of rolling stock is ongoing in each manufacturing company, supported by
different operators. The development cost will be partly covered by operators, but rolling
stock manufacturers expect huge future revenues when the new lines are inaugurated. If
they succeed in the bidding and the new Shinkansen lines are prosperous, they will have
more orders and future sales of parts for maintenance. There is a high level of competition
among the manufacturing companies although all are guaranteed some share so that they
will remain viable. New technology with higher speed, cost reduction, and safety
enhancement will be necessary to win the largest shares of the future market.
There is almost no cooperation among JR companies or among manufacturing companies.
For example, the development for speed-up and safety enhancement is conducted by JR
companies separately with each of several contracted manufacturing companies. In terms
of the development cost and future supply chain management, increased partnership among
manufacturing companies and operators may become necessary since the market of the
railway industry is shrinking and a collaborative relationship would be better for cost
reduction to compete with air and road transportation.
Table 6-11 shows the value exchange between rolling stock manufacturers and the
enterprise. The following figures show, first, value delivery from the enterprise to rolling
stock manufacturers by relative importance to rolling stock manufacturers and current
performance of the enterprise, and second, value delivery from rolling stock manufacturers
to the enterprise by relative importance to the enterprise and current contribution by rolling
stock manufacturers to the enterprise.
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Table 6-11 Value Exchange between manufacturers and the enterprise
Value that rolling stock manufacturers expect from Stakeholders Value contributed to the enterprise by
the enterprise oro1Jn st ck manufacturers
# Larger share among transportation modes Rolling Stock # Safety
# Revenue from manufacturing new trains Manufacturers # Reliability
# Profitability of the operation # Cost reduction
# Future revenue for maintenance, replacement Companies -- includes maintenance
# Efficient relationship with operators Manufacturing # Higher speed
# Cost reduction, technical collaboration Rolling Stock
-- Efficient supply chain management
-- Development cost savings
Source of Format: EVSMA 1.0 for LAI member use only [23]
Large Share
Unknown
---------------------------- - Future Revenue -----------
for Replacement
Efficient
Relationship
with Operators
Profitability
of the Operation
Cost Reduction
Technical
Collaboration
Relative Importance to Rolling Stock Manufacturers
Source of Format: EVSMA
Figure 6-18 "Value Delivery" from the Enterprise to Rolling
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"Value Delivery" from Rolling Stock Manufacturers to the Enterprise: Relative
Importance to the Enterprise and Current Contribution by Rolling Stock
Manufacturers to the Enterprise
90
Speed
a.)0
t
a.)
a.)
IRevenue1
Low High
Low High
A
Freight Rail Operator
In Japan, freight trains operate on conventional lines but not on the Shinkansen tracks.9
The nationwide rail freight carrier, JR Freight, owns only short sections of track that serve
its own terminals and other facilities. Line-haul freight movement is on tracks owned by
the passenger railway companies, under a lease or trackage-rights arrangement. The share
of rail freight in Japan is not as high as in the U.S or Europe, largely because most Japanese
heavy industry is located in port cities and much of the raw material used is imported by
sea. Other problems are that JR Freight, because it does not have much of its own
infrastructure, does not have priority for its trains, and that government policy after the
privatization has focused too much on passenger railways. For the environmental problems
with truck emissions, NOx and CO2 in Japan, we also need to consider the freight rail
operator [27] and the new Shinkansen project must not disadvantage the freight railways.
Actually, as JR Freight does not have line-haul infrastructure, it cannot reduce
infrastructure costs by developing its own lower-cost track maintenance methods. The
only option is cost reduction for the operations. However, the extremely inexpensive price
of truck freight has defeated the freight rail and the latter's share is small.
Because of the avoidable cost rule [8],10 JR Freight has paid less than the amount needed to
cover the maintenance cost for the lines. However, after the construction of new
Shinkansen lines, by the new Shinkansen law and the agreement among central government,
ruling parties, local government, and operators, conventional lines which are parallel to the
new Shinkansen lines will be operated by quasi-public corporations ("third sector", whose
9 In Japan, the width of the Shinkansen track is 1435 mm, the same as standard gauge track in
North America and most of western Europe. Conventional line track is 1067mm gauge. The use of
1435mm gauge for the Shinkansen eliminates the problems of operating both high-speed and
slower-speed trains on the same tracks, and allows different standards of track maintenance to be
used for the Shinkansen and for conventional lines.
10 Avoidable Cost Rule: JR Freight is only charged for the expenditure which is associated with the
wear of the track and which could be avoided if freight trains were not operated. After the
privatization of JNR, this rule has been applied between JR companies and JR Freight. This is less
than the actual maintenance cost and is like a subsidy from JR companies (operators) toward JR
Freight.
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owners are primarily local governmental organizations) and local governments have
announced that they will begin to charge more than the avoidable cost [28]. This change has
already been made on some lines. Changes could be made because of the vague contracts
which did not deal with the details of the future operation of conventional lines.
Additionally, the flexibility of the operations became less since freight operator had to go
through more territories of different passenger railway companies.
After negotiations with the central government, JR Freight has become able to get subsidies
to cover the difference between the new charge and the avoidable cost. Figure 6-20 shows
the new scheme. The government was beginning to change the Japanese new Shinkansen
law to provide that the lease charge can be used not only for construction of new
Shinkansen lines but also for this subsidy. However, the quasi-public corporations are still
in financial trouble and may insist on higher charges, because there is no way that they can
cross-subsidize within their organizations as the passenger JR companies can do.
Before new Shinkansen lines are introduced
JR j
Fr'eight
Conventional Lines alongside the new Shinkan u
Trackage under the Avoidable Cost Rule
3senger Rail Company
Ow
After new Shinkansen lines are introduced
Conventional Lines alongside the new Shinkansen Lies
Freight
Increased Trackage Payment which OW
is not under the Avoidable Cost Rule
Subsidy as compensation
New Shinkansen Lines
T
n the infrastructure
Quasi-Public
Corporation
n the infrastructure
Separated
JR companies
Lease Payment
Source: Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport, Japan [29]
Figure 6-20 New scheme for the subsidies to JR Freight
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Another problem affecting the Hokkaido Shinkansen is that the 53.8 km tunnel under the
Tsugaru Strait will be used by both freight and Shinkansen trains. The government owns
the tunnel and now leases this facility to JR Hokkaido, and passenger and freight trains
running through the tunnel are both 1067mm gauge. Track in the tunnel is designed to be
converted to dual-gauge (1435mm and 1067mm). When this begins, Shinkansen trains
will have priority for operations in the tunnel and this may cause freight trains to be slower
or interfere in other ways. Also, since the tunnel maintenance cost is likely to be large in
the future, both operational priority and the charge from JR Freight to JR Hokkaido will
become controversial issues.
Table 6-12 shows the value exchange between the freight rail operator and the enterprise.
The following figures show, first, value delivery from the enterprise to the freight rail
operator by relative importance to the freight rail operator and current performance of the
enterprise, and second, value delivery from the freight rail operator to the enterprise by
relative importance to the enterprise and current contribution by the freight rail operator to
the enterprise.
Table 6-12 Value Exchange between the freight rail operator and the enterprise
Value that the freight rail operator expects Stakeholders Value entrt the enterprise by the.
from the enterprise
# Lower right-of-way charge Freight Rail # Better enVir6nmnfl quality and fuel
# Priority of operation Operator efficiency
# Subsidy # Serves as a transportation mode
# National-level coordination JR Freight # Utilization of rail
# Efficient relationship with operators # Right-of-way charge
Source of Format: EVSMA 1.0 for LAI member use only [23]
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Figure 6-21 "Value Delivery" from the Enterprise to the Freight Rail Operator: Relative
Importance to the Freight Rail Operator and Current Performance of the Enterprise
Environmental issues
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Source of Format: EVSMA 1.0 for LAI member use only [24]
Figure 6-22 "Value Delivery" from the Freight Rail Operator to the Enterprise: Relative
Importance to the Enterprise and Current Contribution by the Freight Rail
Operator to the Enterprise
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Summary of the Value Exchange
Given the information about each stakeholder's point of view and the value exchange
analysis, the following figure shows the relationship between the stakeholder's relative
importance to the enterprise and the enterprise's value delivery to the stakeholders.
Also, Table 6-13 shows the additional value that needs to be delivered to the stakeholder
group and the value that needs to be delivered to the stakeholder group. Table 6-14 shows
the additional value that should be contributed from the stakeholder group to the enterprise
and the value that apparently need not to be delivered to the enterprise to so much an
extent.
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The relationship between the stakeholder's relative importance to the enterprise and
the enterprise's value delivery to the stakeholders
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Table 6-13 Values that are of major importance to the stakeholder group and values of less
importance
Additional values of major importance that Stakeholders Values of less importance th
need to be delivered to the stakeholder group could be delivered to ti
stakfiholder group
# Reasonable fare Customers (#_Speed)
# Lower financial burden Other Individuals
# Better environmental quality and energy Society at Large
efficiency by freight railways
# Better economic situation
# Better Economic situation Central # Political benefit
Government
# Lower burden of expense Local # Political benefit
# Better economic situation Government
# Total coordination of transportation modes Operators
-- Between air and rail
# Profitability of the operation
# Lower Lease Payment
# Stable, Sustainable Operation
# Cost reduction, technical collaboration Manufacturers (# Improvement in Speed)
-- Efficient supply chain management
-- Development cost savings
# Lower right-of-way charge Freight Railway
# Priority of the operation Company
# National-level coordination
# Efficient Relationship with operators
Table 6-14 Values that are of major importan ce to the Enter rise and values of less importance
Additional values of major importance that Stakeholders Values of*
should be contributed from the stakeholder could be delivered to the enterprisi
group to the enterprise
# Ridership and profitability Customers
# Needs and Requirements for operation
This implies that more market research should
be done by the enterprise.
# Opinions through mass media or politicians Other
-->More attention to politics Individuals
Data should be readily available to the public.
# Better selection and contracting of transferred Society at
conventional lines Large
# Leadership Central # Justification of construction
# Accurate investigation and analysis for Government
The selection of the new lines
# Total coordination of transportation modes
# Accurate demand analysis for the selection of Local # Justification of construction
new lines Government # Operation of conventional lines
# Better Relationship with freight rail
# Analysis for operation Operators
# Decision making process
# Cost reduction Manufacturers (# Higher speed)
Freight # Better environmental situation
Railwav # Utilization of rail
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Following is a short summary of the result from the value exchange analysis:
* Environmental and economic issues are important, but we need to reduce the national
expenditure. We need to define how much we can use the national expenditure for each
issue.
* Leadership of the central government is necessary in order to proceed. However, this
does not mean the directorship, but rather the coordination of a lean enterprise. For
example, the coordination between the airline and railway industries is necessary to
stabilize both of these businesses that depend on economies of scale.
* For processes of deciding whether the construction is appropriate or not, accurate
investigation and data analysis are necessary. We need to eliminate "political" motives
from the enterprise as much as possible. Profitability is the critical issue for the success
of the enterprise, and if the project is not profitable, the ability to stop the project is
necessary.
* Lease payments should be defined to satisfy all the stakeholder groups. We should define
how to set an equitable lease payment in the early stages. It is necessary to have a scheme
to share the profit and cost from the new lines in a balanced manner with all stakeholders
every year.'1 It should be variable each year since the demand is unpredictable.
* Freight railways should be considered more seriously in the earlier stages. Because of the
present management structure, the freight railway is at a disadvantage, and this new
enterprise also makes its situation harder in terms of the priority of operation and
right-of-way charge. For example, the relationship between JR Freight and local
governments is being made worse by this project and it may hurt the freight railway
operations. Freight railways have potential to increase the usage of rail and to ease
environmental concerns. The enterprise should not undermine the industry and should
consider national-level coordination with the freight railways.
11 Governments are non-profit organizations, but they also need some benefit from the enterprise for
use in further projects or to recover the past construction costs.
97
* Manufacturers and operators need technical collaboration for reduction of development
costs and efficient supply chain management. This reduces the total cost of the enterprise
and enhances the competitiveness with air and road transportation.
This section analyzed the value exchange between enterprise and stakeholders to explore
the concept of the lean enterprise. In the next section, we are going to discuss the process
of the project in order to make the process leaner.
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6.2.4. Process Analysis
According to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport website [7], the basic
scheme of the enterprise processes in the early stage was as shown in Figure 6-24.
Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport
__________________________I
Establish or Change NSL
[Section 4 of NSL]
Basic Planning
[Section 4 of NSL]
SDirection of 
Investigation[Section 5 of NSL]
Nomination of Construction Agency &
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[Section 7 of NSL]
Direction of Construction
[Section 8 of NSL]
Approval of Construction
Planning [Section 9 of NSL]
4Iit'
## NSL: The new Shinkansen law.
Other Organizations
egotiation
reenen Construction Agency
Operating Agency
Negoiati Construction Agency
Agre ment Operating Agency
Aporoval Construction Company
4-'------n Construction Planning
Subbnission [Section 9 of NSL]
Hearings
Cost Allocation between Central and
Local Government Construction Compan
[Section 13 of NSL] C
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Inspection of New Lines Reduest Construction Agency
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[by Railways Operation Law]
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Financial Information
Source of Format: Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport Report Website,
arranged by author[22]
Figure 6-24 The Basic Scheme of the Enterprise Processes in the Early Stage
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This thesis utilizes the EVSMA method for eliminating waste and creating better
value-adding processes. Figure 6-25 shows the value stream mapping by sequence, based
on the information above and what actually happened in the past [7][30]. There are three
kinds of activities: value-added activities, non-value-added needed activities, and
non-value-added unneeded activities.
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Figure 6-25 Value Stream Map as the Enterprise Currently Operates
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The activity of the new Shinkansen enterprise consists of the selection process, followed by
a basic planning process, and finally an operation and an adjustment process. The original
framework with the new Shinkansen law and government regulations was expected to work
well but the actual process did not work well: the framework included many processes that
were non-value-added unneeded activities and value-added activities whose performance
was not good enough.
Non Value-Added Unneeded Processes: late adjustment of contracts and the new
Shinkansen law
Most of the non-value-added processes were associated with the late adjustment of the
lease contract and the new Shinkansen law. All stakeholders agreed to the construction
project based on the new Shinkansen law, consultation, and the contract in the selection
process. Therefore, too many radical changes after the selection process made the balance
of the value exchange among stakeholders and the enterprise worse.
First, the late change of a fundamental element of the contract, the lease payment, has been
controversial. The central government and JR East came into a conflict with each other
about the additional lease charge in the contract after the further extension to the other
operator's area was budgeted. JR East, one of the operators, is now opposing the additional
payment for the following reasons. First, if this provision had existed when JR East agreed
to the construction of new Shinkansen lines, JR East would not have accepted it since this
additional payment is against its business judgment as a private company. JR East assumed
that the construction would not have a negative impact on its finances and therefore
approved of the construction of new Shinkansen lines without the additional lease charge.
Second, if there is more profit in the future, the profit should be returned to the government
through the corporate income tax and not through such a method as an additional lease
charge. On the other hand, the government considers the additional charge reasonable since
the resources for the construction project came from the citizens and everyone should enjoy
the results of the new Shinkansen lines. (The government officials have said that this profit
12 The government is now considering the additional charge to an operator for its profit that
will be increased in its area by the extension of a new line into another operator's area.
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will be used for further extension projects in Japan.) This conflict occurred partly because it
is the first time that the extension will involve two different operator areas, but it was
apparent that it will involve the two areas and the enterprise should have negotiated before.
We can say that the later change was because of the lack of consideration and negotiations.
Additionally, the same conflict will surely occur when they set the scheme for the asset
treatment at the lease term's end point, 30 years later. The vague contract about the asset
treatment was partly because of the uncertainty of the profitability, but we can imagine that
the government avoided the conflict at that time for the purpose of promoting the new lines.
Thus, a late radical change of contract will spoil the value balance of the stakeholders and
nullify the cooperative relationship.
Second, the other non-value-added process is the late process in which the new Shinkansen
law was changed for the subsidy to the JR Freight. After the construction funding was
appropriated, local governments suddenly set the freight rail access fees of the conventional
lines parallel to the newly constructed Shinkansen line much higher than JR companies did.
Because JR Freight had been in poor condition and facing financial difficulties after the
privatization, having no indirect subsidy for paying these higher access fees might have led
to financial collapse of the freight railway. Finally, the central government decided to grant
a subsidy from the profit of the new Shinkansen line to JR Freight, which made the
cross-subsidy between stakeholders more complicated. As a result, only the local
governments can charge JR Freight a higher access charge, while JR companies still have
to charge less to JR Freight as an indirect subsidy, and also must provide cross subsidies
from profitable lines in the urban area to support unprofitable lines in the rural areas of
these local governments. In contrast, in Germany, the federal states have to pay charges as
subsidy to the operators when they want to continue unprofitable lines. From this point of
view, the Japanese local governments ultimately succeeded in increasing the value delivery
from the enterprise, because they could get the new lines, could charge more to JR Freight
as the access fees for using the transferred conventional lines, and did not lose any of the
unprofitable conventional lines.
Additionally, there will be no guarantee to the freight rail operator of having operational
priority on the transferred conventional lines or through the Seikan Tunnel, which will be
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used by both freight rail and Shinkansen.) It is because the enterprise as a whole tends to
give first priority to the passenger high speed rail. Later negotiation about the priority and
access charge will put the freight rail company in a much weaker position. The negotiation
process between JR Freight and the enterprise should be done earlier to insure that it
become a value-added process that enhances the balance of the value exchange.
To sum up, the radical changes in the contract and laws, occurring after the selection
process, have spoiled the balance of the value exchange among stakeholders and enterprise,
and it was a consequence that resulted from nothing other than political interventions. To
make the process a value-added one, all the processes above should be negotiated before
the selection of lines and stakeholders. Then, under the fully specified scheme, the
enterprise can and should pursue the goal of being a cooperative, lean enterprise.
Problems of value-added activities: no efforts to anticipate other potential problems
In the selection process, especially before all stakeholders are involved in the project, there
has also been no effort to settle other potential problems that may arise after the operation.
Since stakeholders expect completely different values, and political interventions easily
occur in the railway industry, only earlier treatment of the potential future problems allows
the enterprise to become a lean one.
For example, congestion problems on the rails may crop up as in the U.K. reform. For
example, local government, one of the investors, and JR Hokkaido will be likely to insist
on increasing the number of direct trips to Tokyo for the Hokkaido Shinkansen line. Now
all the Shinkansen lines of JR East will go to the urban area between Tokyo and Omiya,
where the frequency is nearly at capacity now. It is apparent that the Tokyo-Omiya section
will be overcrowded and the enterprise will have to consider the risk of an increased chance
of disruption, as in the situation of Railtrack in the U.K. There were no incentives for
Railtrack to increase the capacity and that caused the later terrible disruption. A plan is
needed in the early stage to cope with the future capacity problems.
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Problems of value-added activities: problems of data collection and analysis in the
selection process
Central and local governments have performed data collection and analysis independently,
which is wasteful. Integrated data collection and analysis with the cooperation of all
stakeholders will decrease both costs and political intervention, and increase the accuracy
and neutrality of conclusions. Additionally, cooperation with a university or other
organization which has no preference for a particular stakeholder, like LAI, may be
appropriate to keep the research neutral.
The data collection and analysis also has lacked sensitivity analysis by frequency, travel
time, and competition with airlines. It should also estimate the waste of asset utilization
caused by lengthy construction times. Constructing several planned lines at the same time
makes the construction time longer, given budget constraints. Sensitivity analysis will
enable the enterprise to judge whether new lines are appropriate or not, and utilize the
capital investment best for all stakeholders. As the project process goes on, more
stakeholders should be involved in the data collection and analysis in a cooperative manner.
Problems of value-added activities: late operations planning
Operations planning should be discussed at the end of the selection process to more fully
specify the contract. Operations planning includes frequency, timetable, fare, and similar
factors. Specified operation planning agreed to by all stakeholders allows the enterprise to
predict potential problems. It also helps with the future demand analysis.
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6.2.5. Process Interactions
In this section, key flows of information, cooperation, and financial resources will be
analyzed according to factors such as stability, timeliness, accuracy, completeness. Table
6-15 is the analysis of interactions among the group of stakeholders and Figure 6-26
shows a simplified visual version of the result.
Table 6-15 Interactions among the Groups of Stakeholders
Interaction goes:
From To
what flws
in this
intenrtinn?
a
a
.4
IV
a.
o .41 .4 <
'A
,A
Note
Central Government Local Government x x x x h h h h Local grants and subsidies from the central government will cover most 
of the
construction cost.
Local Government Central Government x x h h h h Local govement outsources the research work and promotes the project
most.
Central Government Passenger Rail x x M 1 1 Interactions are through consultation and somewhat imprecise contracts.
Operators
Passenger Rail Central Government x x x x 1 Need to have cooperative relationship, but also need to avoid interference by
Operators politicians.
Local Government Passenger Rail 1 The lines to be transferred were selected by law and there was no discussion
Loca__Gvrnmen Operators - - - which lines should be selected.
Passenger Rail Local Government 1 1 1 JR companies did not show any data on unprofitable lines when the
Operators conventional lines are transferred to local government.
Customers, Citizens,
Society at turges
Central and Local
Government x x m m m
This is not the only reason why people vote for some certain politicians and
their opinions may unfortunately not be represented by polticians.
Central and Local Customers, Citizens, There is no sentitivity analysis in the planning process and not much publicly
Government Society at large available data on the results of the new operation.
Customers, Citizens, Passenger Rail t - After the new operations begin, this information is very important for
Society at large Operators i - 4succeeding s the competitive market.
Passenger Rail
fOecerrs
Customers, Citizens,
Society at lare x x m m h m
Continuous information of the new operations needed for increasing the
ridershin fisures.
Freight Rail Operator Central Gover ent x x 1 1 h 1 JR Freight should have negotiated about the access fees oflocal lines before
the new Shinkansen project was executed.
C GLate response regarding access fees and operational prionty may threaten 
the
management of JR Freight.
Freight Rail Operator Local Government xis m I h 1 There were no interactions between JR Freight and local government. They
need to negotiate about the increased access fees of the local government.
Local Government Freight Rail Operator I 1 11Local government should have discussed the increased access fee with JR
LPassgernt Rail It Freight before construction of new Shinkansen lines.
Passengerail FreightRai Operator s s R s m m m h There was a low access fee to JR Freight and operators kept the same fee in
Freight~ their lpianes. mmOperators eir lines.
sFreight Rail Operator issRail m m h h There was a low access fee to JR Freight and operators kept the fee in their
Operators - - - - lines.
Passenger Rail Passenger Rail i m This relationship should be established in the selection process, but it happens
Operators Operators I I too late to influence the project selection process.
Passenger Rail Rolhng Stock For new lines, new speccifications of trains may be necessary, requiring ais x xx m h m m
Operators Manufacturer x product development process.
Rolling Stock Passenger Rail x x x m h m h In the development, communication and cooperation is involved.
Manufacturer Operators I I
Rolling Stock Rolling Stock x I I I I There is almost no interaction because of competition.
Manufacturer Manufacturer I I
Source of Format: EVSMA 1.0 for LAI member use only [31]
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Figure 6-26 Interactions between stakeholders
As a result, to become a lean enterprise, this new Shinkansen enterprise needs to have
higher performance levels for the following interactions, which are of higher importance
and for which the performance level is low.
Interactions between Central Government and Passenger Rail Operators
Interactions are now through consultation, regulation, and the contracts. The enterprise
needs to avoid interference by politicians, but also to have a cooperative relationship
between government and private companies.
First, the regulation and the lease contract should have a very important role in the
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separation between the government and the railway operator, to insure the management
autonomy and good financial condition of a private company. The government and
operators now have lease contracts which show independence from the government, since
one of the reasons why the JNR (Japanese National Railways) was divided and restructured
in 1987 was the external interference from the government and lack of management
autonomy. This lease contract prevents JR companies from accepting construction of
unprofitable lines and bearing too much construction cost or debt for these lines. Therefore,
this contract plays the role of separating private operating companies from the government
and political decisions.
In addition to that, the consultation and contract should also enhance the integrity of the
whole enterprise later. Once the contract has functioned appropriately regarding both
separation and integrity at the first stage, continuous effort toward the lean enterprise ideal
should allow all stakeholders to have a cooperative relationship to achieve their goals. After
the meaningful negotiation of the fully specified contract, all stakeholders can continue to
strive for an ever better lean enterprise.
However, the lease contract is imprecise, not fully specified (refer to section 6.2.4) and thus
includes potential problems. Also, once a new line has been selected, there has been no
framework or organization to aim at the lean enterprise ideal to maximize the enterprise
level for the satisfaction of all stakeholders. The cooperative relationship between central
government and operators is a key to succeeding in pursuing this aim.
Interactions between Local Government and Passenger Rail Operators
Even though the central government is the leadership of the enterprise, local governments
and passenger rail operators are also important stakeholders and their interactions are
important for obtaining optimal solutions at the level of local details. For example, the lines
to be transferred from JR companies to local government were selected by law and there
was no discussion about which lines should be transferred, even though many sections of
the law were being changed as problems occurred. If there had been interactions between
local government and passenger rail operators, they could have negotiated with each other
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about which line should be transferred from JR companies to local government or might
even have changed the most unprofitable lines in the local area from rail operation to bus
operations because bus operating cost is much lower than the cost of railway service. Such
interaction will allow the enterprise as a whole to obtain better solutions at the local detail
level and thereby support the enterprise better.
Interactions between Passenger Rail Operators
This relationship should be established in the selection process, but it can often happen too
late to influence the project selection process, since detailed operational planning affects
the future demand and profit. Also, earlier negotiation will reduce the risk of future trouble
in terms of each stakeholder's value. Frequency, fare policy, rolling stock development
plans, and maintenance should be discussed before concluding agreement on the project.
Frequency, especially, may cause congestion problems on the railway lines in urban areas
and needs to be clarified in the contract. After the beginning of operation, cooperative
interaction and well balanced value exchange must be sustained for safety and high quality
of service.
Additionally, each JR company researches and develops faster trains independently and
there is no collaboration with each other or with the government. No integration exists and
this is one of the aspects of the waste in the whole enterprise architecture. For example, JR
East is now working alone to develop the world's fastest steel wheel train (operational
maximum speed: 360km/h) without any subsidy, and JR Central is also trying to improve
the speed as well as researching maglev trains by itself. The research and development is
being done independently by each JR company and the role of government is extremely
low. Government does not want to involve itself in the project because of its huge debt, but
also JR companies want the government out of the process from the point of a private
company. Considering the difficult situation caused by the modal shift to automobiles from
railway transportation, it is appropriate for government to be in the process for high-cost
innovative development like maglev trains and higher speed railways, in order to make the
development integrated. For example, the most innovative development of the first
Shinkansen in 1964 was accomplished through government involvement in the process.
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This waste and non-integration should be eliminated, from the point of view of the entire
enterprise.
Interactions between the Freight Rail Operator and the Central Government
JR Freight should have actively negotiated about the access fees of conventional lines
which are paralleled by the new Shinkansen lines before the new Shinkansen project was
executed, since the local government could suddenly charge much higher access fees
because there were no pertinent agreements in the contract. Central government has now
changed the law to protect the freight railway, but the operational complexity has increased
because the freight has to run on the tracks of many different operators and the freight and
passenger trains will have to coordinate operations on the same tracks through the Seikan
Tunnel. Further negotiation should proactively be done, since the passenger railway usually
has higher priority in operations. Late responses regarding access fees and operational
priority may threaten the financial stability of JR Freight.
Interactions between Rolling Stock Manufacturers
Development is ongoing in each manufacturing company, sponsored by different operators.
The development cost will be partly covered by operators but they expect huge future
revenue when introducing the new trains. There is competition among manufacturing
companies to some extent, and new technology with cost reduction and safety is necessary
to win in future bidding. Therefore, there is almost no cooperation among manufacturing
companies. They are eager to succeed in the development so as to sell more rolling stock at
a higher price. If they succeed in the project and the new Shinkansen lines are prosperous,
they will have more orders.
However, in terms of the development cost and future supply chain management,
partnership among manufacturing companies and operators is necessary since the railway
industry is not as big as other industries. This cooperation can be achieved by the
leadership of operators.
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6.2.6. X-Matrix Evaluation
The X-Matrix is an evaluation of the interrelationship between key processes, stakeholder
values, strategic objectives and metrics. This evaluation shows whether all items are
working together or not.
Definition of Metrics
In this section, we complete our definitions with those of metrics. The new Shinkansen
projects are based on the new Shinkansen law and government plays an important
leadership role in the enterprise. For such national projects, the metrics should be in
government publications and documents. According to the government official website [22],
the following metrics are tracked:
*Economic effect [Yen] for 30 years, and economic effect / construction cost
This metric is, first, used to show whether the new line is worth constructing or not. If
this amount is big enough, central government will get more tax and get some profit
from this project. This metric is also important for citizens to check whether the
project is appropriate or not.
*Change in travel time
Travel time depends on the track and on development of rolling stock. This metric is
one of the elements to estimate the future demand.
* Ridership
Given that the fare is almost fixed, ridership directly affects the revenue of railway
companies and also affects their lease payment to the government.
* Change in profitability for an extended line over 30 years
Metrics of profitability are usually used for fixing the amount of lease payment after
the first year operation.
* Total Construction Cost
Total construction cost is one of the constraints when deciding whether the new line
will be constructed or not.
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X-Matrix Evaluation
This section will evaluate the alignment of strategic objectives, metrics, key processes, and
stakeholder values by using the "X-Matrix". The strategic objectives are from section 6.1,
stakeholder's values are from section 6.2.3, and key processes are from section 6.2.4.
1. Alignment of metrics with strategic oblectives
Figure 6-27 shows how the metrics accurately assess the enterprise performance for
strategic objectives. Many strategic objectives are not well captured by any of the metrics:
First, a strategic objective -equivalent contracts and regulation- needs some metrics that
can be measured. Suggested metrics would be how the enterprise provides sufficient value
to each stakeholder as in the value exchange analysis (section6.2.3). The standard of
sufficient value depends on each stakeholder's contribution to the enterprise and it is
difficult to measure quantitatively. However, through a continuous enterprise level
committee (section 6.3), the enterprise can achieve the optimal value exchange in the
enterprise.
Second, a strategic objective -integration of the total system- has no related metrics. This
objective is also hard to measure but it should be tracked through evaluation by each
stakeholder.
Third, a strategic objective -safety on a long-term basis-, can be measured by the safety
performance and the condition of the infrastructure. Now we do not have the metric, but it
should be continuously used after the opening of the operation.
Fourth, a strategic objective -solve the environmental problems - is also hard to measure,
but we need to have approximate estimates to decide the investment priority and to track
the result from the investment. The investment priority can be measured by the ratio of the
government investment from the budget to the investment in road construction and
maintenance that is the largest part of national expenditure for transport. It shows the
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government intention toward the environmental issues. Also, better environmental quality
from the investment, such as reductions in C0 2, NOx, and energy consumption, should be
the metrics to recognize the validity of the project. These metrics should be measured not
only for the Shinkansen service but also for freight railways since total improvement is the
true output from the project.
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Figure 6-27 Alignment of metrics with strategic objectives
Other problems associated with the metrics are the accuracy and continuity of the
measurement. Before construction, all the presently used metrics are based on the research
funded by the government. We may need some equitable organization funded or overseen
by all stakeholders, which means that everybody has a voice in decisions and there is no
bias in the organization. Also, after the construction, all the measurement for metrics tends
to be considered less seriously because the local and central governments focus mainly on
decision making for the construction and the lease payment which is determined in the first
year. To sum up, the enterprise needs to track the metrics carefully and equitably, both
before and after the construction.
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2. Alignment of metrics with key processes
Figure 6-28 shows how the metrics are utilized in the enterprise to measure process
performance. Most of the processes are measured by the current metrics, but this analysis
tells us that the budget allocation process needs some metrics.
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Figure 6-29 Alignment of metrics with strategic objectives
First, total coordination of the transportation should also be analyzed more, especially with
air transportation. There was no sensitivity analysis in terms of fares, frequency and travel
times. Each mode is an economy of scale business and a new strategy for regulation may be
necessary for both industries.
Second, environmental issues are not analyzed well at any of the processes. The
governmental officials considered it important, but there are no specific metrics for the
projects. Before selecting the new lines, the extent of the environmental effects should be
considered. Also, how much the government should spend instead of investing in road
construction is an important question.
Thirdly, freight rail should be considered in the earlier process since the freight rail
operator is a stakeholder that may lose its operational priority and will be affected by the
higher access charges by the enterprise. The metric is hard to define but the estimated
change should be mentioned as a metric and this needs agreement in the early process of
the project.
Finally, there are no processes to access the association and efficient, integrated relationship
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within stakeholders. It is necessary to have processes to increase such a relationship in
order to maximize the limited resources available. Processes in which stakeholders
recognize barriers to achieve the strategic objectives and cope with the barriers will be very
important. For example, the government and operators tends to be opponents because of the
financial issues, but they need to eliminate the barriers first and to corporate with each
other for pursuing the strategic objectives.
4. Alignment of strategic objectives with stakeholder values
Figure 6-30 shows how stakeholder values are represented by the strategic objectives. The
strategic objectives are set in section 6.2.1, based on the general information and input from
the international comparison. By this X-metrics analysis, these suggested strategic
objectives are well covered for all of the stakeholders' values.
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6.3. Future State Vision
Based on the analysis Figure 6-31 shows the suggested value stream map of the future
enterprise.
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Figure 6-31 The Suggested Value Stream Map of the Future Enterprise
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Based on the analysis in section 6.2, the new vision is as follows:
Basic Analysis and Basic Planning Process
At the beginning, the central government will be in charge of the first, basic "big picture"
analysis and planning. The enterprise is at a national level and government should have the
leadership.
Organization of the New Enterprise Committee
As a typical recommendation when introducing the lean ideal, it is suggested that a special
committee team that worries about as enterprise-wide should be organized to aim at the
lean ideal. Even though the project is at the national level, an enterprise committee should
consist of representatives of all stakeholders for each proposed line (instead of only a
committee that mainly consists of central government and ruling parties). Such new
committees can equitably represent all stakeholders and allow the enterprise to create a
plan that provides sufficient value to each stakeholder, based on the way that each
stakeholder contributes to the enterprise. (Section 6.2.3)
Further Analysis conducted by the New Enterprise Committee
Then, further analysis should be managed by the enterprise committee to insure research
that is as objective as possible, instead of research being managed only by the government.
The choice of assumptions and focus of the research should be made with the agreement of
all stakeholders.
Important matters such as estimating future demand include many assumptions and depend
partly on the involved stakeholders' intentions. For example, local and central government
officials forecast that the share of Hokkaido Shinkansen between Tokyo and Sapporo will
be 45 %, with air at 55 % [33]. This figure was used to estimate the profitability of the new
line and the expected lease payment from operators. Table 6-16 shows the comparison
between air and rail for trips from Tokyo, and Figure 6-32 shows the statistical relationship
between distance and the relative share of Shinkansen to total passengers. By using simple
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regression analysis, the expected share of Hokkaido Shinkansen between Tokyo and
Sapporo is forecast to be only 10% of the total, the same as for the similar distance between
Tokyo and Fukuoka. Even on the shorter 500 km Tokaido Shinkansen section between
Tokyo and Osaka, there is a fierce competition between air and rail and the Shinkansen
share decreased from 85% in 1993 to 70% in 2005 [34]. Transportation between Tokyo and
Hokkaido is also one of the most profitable routes for the airline industry and we can
anticipate the same situation for the Hokkaido Shinkansen line as is now the case for the
Tokaido Shinkansen. Also, the Japanese government is now planning to construct an
additional runway and to expand the capacity of Haneda Airport through the government
subsidy, which will make the competition fiercer [35] [36].
Table 6-16 Comparison between Air and Rail for Trips from Tokyo
Section Mode Number of Distance Time
Passengers [min]
Tokyo-Aomori Train 1,979,000 713.7 239
Air 958,000 183
Tokyo - Akita Train 1,292,000 662.6 230
Air 1,048,000 173
Tokyo - Sakata Train 358,000 421.4 271
Air 378,000 178
Tokyo - Yamagata Train 2,394,000 359.9 150
Air 58,000 176
Tokyo Area - Train 470,000
Hokkaido Area Air 23,030,000 -
Tokyo - Sapporo Train 156,000 660
(before through 1073.7Shinkansen Air 7,631,000 210
construction)
Tokyo - Osaka Train 14,000,000 515.4 161Air 6,000,000 162
Tokyo - Okayama Train 1,179,000 676.3 180Air 386,000 178
Tokyo - Hiroshima Train 1,831,000 821.2 240
Air 1,711,000 213
Tokyo - Fukuoka Train 895,000 1069.1 300
Air 7,631,000 213
Source: JR East [9]
Note: The data for Tokyo-Sapporo and Tokyo Area - Hokkaido Area Sections are for the present,
when the sections north of Tokyo-Hachinohe are conventional lines.
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Figure 6-32 Statistical relationship between distance and the relative share of
Shinkansen to total passengers of air and Shinkansen
Thus, we can say that the government research has many optimistic assumptions and that
an enterprise committee will be an appropriate organization to determine accurate
information. Also, the committee should do a sensitivity analysis instead of making just a
point estimate as at present, because there are many unknown factors that can change future
demand and profitability: the travel time, frequency, reliability, government policy, original
fare, fare policy, and marketing strategies. Anticipated situations that some stakeholders are
concerned about should be included in the sensitivity analysis for the equitable value
exchange. In this way, designing lean enterprise architecture should help a better analysis
and decision making process.
Second, focus of the data collection and analysis should be made with the agreement of all
stakeholders. For example, if there is such a committee, some stakeholder would surely
insist on the necessity of the analysis for the construction planning before selection and
budget allocation of a new line. Sensitivity analysis for the construction and budget
planning will also tell us the optimal selection of lines to be constructed and what is a
manageable number of construction projects in order to maximize profit. Usually, such
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choice and the increase of total budget will shorten the construction time, which will allow
the enterprise to earn a profit earlier. The selection of lines or a line, construction planning,
and budget allocation should be done based on the sensitivity analysis. To sum up,
designing lean enterprise architecture allows us to choose the necessary research for the
project and enhance the project.
Basic Planning Process
Based on the sensitivity analysis, the enterprise committee needs to do the EVSMA, as in
the sections from 6.2.3 to 6.2.6 to design the lean enterprise architecture. For the strategic
objectives, the enterprise should optimize the value exchanges, metrics, and processes. The
metrics that should be set in the enterprise would, by the judgment of author, appear to be
as follows:
* Economic effect [yen] for 30 years, and economic effect/construction cost
* Change in travel time
* Ridership
* Change in profitability for a line extension during 30 years
* Total construction cost
* Equitable contracts and regulation from the discussion of the value exchange analysis
* Safety investment and potentially necessary investment over the long term
* The ratio of the government railway investment to the budget for road investment
* The change in environmental indexes such as C0 2, NOx, and energy consumption
The X-metrics analysis for strategic objectives, metrics, processes, and stakeholders' value
should be continuously done to check the status and to pursue the ideal lean enterprise
(refer to section 6.2.6). This continuous checking system is one of the beneficial important
of the lean enterprise concept.
Also, the sensitivity analysis indicates that the next thing for the enterprise to do is to try to
make a fully specified scheme before the selection of a new line. A scheme which is
made in the earlier stage allows the enterprise to pursue the goal of being a cooperative,
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lean enterprise after the construction. Based on the stakeholders' value exchange analysis
(session 6.2.3), the contract and regulations should be designed to provide sufficient value
to each stakeholder. The importance of the value delivery to stakeholders depends on how
stakeholders contribute to the enterprise. The main stakeholders are the freight operator,
passenger operators, and central and local government. A suggested contract and
regulations are as follows:
1. Lease Contract
Central and local governments, as representatives of taxpayers, have the right to collect the
construction cost from operators. However, they should not collect more than the
construction cost minus increased tax revenue generated by the construction for the
purpose of further construction of Shinkansen lines, because it will be a cross-subsidy to
the other operator's area. Also, local government should not increase the access charge to
freight operators later since that changes the value exchange balance. The capital
investment of the Seikan Tunnel has been subsidized by the government, and the additional
lease payment can be used for the maintenance for the tunnel, because the safety level of
the Tunnel is very important for the Hokkaido and Tohoku Shinkansen lines.
On the other hand, operators have a right to earn profit from the operations. In the
competitive market with the airline industry, the revenue can be changed every year by
strategies which include travel time, reliability, headway, and fare policy (basic fare and
discount fare) of both railway and airline companies. In this case, if the lease payment is
fixed for 30 years at the level based on the increased profit of the first operational year,
distribution of the increased profit will not be equitable for 30 years. Especially in the most
competitive markets, the price and ridership will change every year. If such fixed charge is
established, only operators will bear the risks associated with potential changes in revenue.
Additionally, operators also have the right to have enough cash flow for long-term safety
investment for infrastructure. This maintenance budget should not be eliminated by the
excessive lease payment to be used for the construction of other lines. In the privatization
in the railway industry, long-term investment is essential to enhance safety. A private
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company does businesses on the pay-as-you-go basis and the increased revenue should also
be used for its capital investment plan. If operators own the asset, the depreciation expense
allows them to keep enough cash flow for the future investment, but there is no such cash
flow in the lease contract. In Japan, since further safety enhancement is demanded by
customers, huge capital investment and maintenance costs are required. If this charge turns
out to be equitable, operators enjoy enough cash flow, which allows the operators to invest
for further safety with a long-term perspective. In New Frontier 2008 [37], the five year
planning of JR East focuses more on operating cash flow than on free cash flow, because it
focuses on the positive capital investment that will generate profit and enhance safety in the
long-term.
In terms of the additional lease payment for the next construction between Aomori and
Hakodate on the Hokkaido Shinkansen line, it is recommended to transfer some portion of
the additional profit per year that JR East will earn (as a result of construction in the JR
Hokkaido area) as lease payments to other stakeholders. The percentage should be based on
the value exchange analysis within the enterprise and also be able to cover all anticipated
problems, based on the sensitivity analysis and the agreement with all stakeholders. We
need to search for the best distribution of profit to operators, government and other
stakeholders. The degree to which the major stakeholders suffer or benefit from the project
should also be shared.
Finally, at the end of the lease term, ownership of the asset should be specified in the
contract to make the contract equitable as a whole. A vague, indefinite termination process
in the contract can spoil all the equity of the provisions of the contract above, since the total
burden of the construction cost and distribution of profit from the project should be
equivalent. There are two options after the 30 years: government will continue to own the
infrastructure or government will transfer the infrastructure. If the line is profitable enough,
the lease contract should be terminated and the asset should be transferred to the private
operators, for a payment equal to the asset value as reduced by depreciation. The asset
value should be obtained automatically by provisions which are made in this early stage.
On the other hand, if the line is not profitable, the government should continue to hold the
asset and to keep the lease contract, since the government has estimated the line is
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profitable and it should be responsible for the project. As many future possibilities as
possible involving the profitability should be covered precisely in the contract to keep the
value delivery to stakeholders equitable and to avoid possible later conflict.
2. Regulations
In terms of the equitable value exchange, regulation should be clarified in the early stage
for freight railways and conventional lines whose operation will be transferred to the local
government. Equivalent value delivery and allocation of responsibility to all stakeholders
can be provided partly by these regulations. Further regulation should deal with the
competition between railways and air transportation.
First, the freight rail operator should not suffer from the transfer of the operation of
conventional lines to the local governments, or from the sharing of the tunnel by both
Shinkansen and freight rail. Since the freight operator is in a weak position, it should get
the right established before construction begins to have operational priority and an equal or
less expensive lease charge in order to protect the freight railways. (The value exchange
analysis in section 6.2.3 explained its weak position in the project and in the railway
industry.) It is very important to protect the freight railways, because freight railways have
the potential to take truck trips off the road if they have stronger positions and strategic
logistics planning is allowed. Since the freight railways have also effect on the
environmental issues as in the strategic objectives of the enterprise, the enterprise needs to
consider the total effect on the environment of freight and passenger railways even though
the project is for the passenger high speed rail.
Second, the enterprise should be able to choose which lines will be transferred, or at least
to have a voice in this selection. The new Shinkansen law has a provision that the operation
of the conventional lines paralleled by the new Shinkansen line should be transferred to the
local government. This paralleled line or lines is usually a trunk line in the conventional
network, and even though the transferred operation will not usually be economically viable
after the new Shinkansen opens, the remaining level of passenger traffic on the paralleled
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lines will be higher than traffic on connecting secondary and branch lines in rural areas.
Also, the paralleled line, as a trunk line, is likely to be used by the freight railway and the
transfer of operation will affect the freight railway company. If the enterprise can choose
which lines will be transferred among the conventional lines in the area served by the new
Shinkansen line, it would naturally include the least viable lines. The local government
then should be able to choose whether it will continue the rail operation or replace some or
all lines by bus service, which has a lower operating cost. In cases where the new
Shinkansen line is not expected to be profitable, it would be appropriate for local and
central government to evaluate the trade-off between A) having the unprofitable new
Shinkansen line and changing to bus operation on some of the most unprofitable lines, and
B) cancelling the new Shinkansen project and continuing the existing unprofitable lines in
the rural area. The central and local governments are responsible for the project, and this
kind of provision would increase their responsibility for promoting the project and reduce
the chance of politically motivated uneconomic construction.
Third, we need to consider the regulations for the competition between air and rail
transportation. Pricing regulation will especially affect the relative share of ridership
between air and rail. Under the present law, railway fares cannot be increased without
proper reasons and if the government considers increases inappropriate, it can force the fare
to remain unchanged [38]. Below the upper limit, operators can change fares without
approval, but operators have to submit their fare policy to the government and the
government has the right to change it when it is not reasonable [30] [38]. For example, if
the fare change is judged to be detrimental to the competitors, users, or the public good, the
government can force operators not to change the fare. As a result, fare is almost entirely
based on distance and revenue management is not allowed in the Japanese railways, while
airlines are allowed to decrease fares by 50 % based on each airline's decision [36]. Given
the fierce competition with the airline industry in the future, fare policy and its regulation
will determine the future revenue and stability of the railway business. There are two
choices in the future competitive market: to have basically fixed prices under the existing
regulations or to have revenue management, as in the U.S airline industry. Amtrak also has
a kind of revenue management: the price changes with time of day [39]. Regulations should
be changed in early stages to aim at the situation where the enterprise can estimate the
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future demand more easily and can have appropriate strategies to serve the long-term
stability of the total Japanese transportation system.
For all concerned, more detailed negotiation is necessary for regulation. Designing the lean
enterprise architecture should be one of the ways to have equitable regulation.
3. Iteration of the basic planning processes
Value delivery from the enterprise should be equivalent for all stakeholders. Also, if there is
no agreement for the fully specified contract, the enterprise should not begin to construct
the lines. Iteration of research, by EVSMA analysis and negotiation among all stakeholders
will enable the contract to be almost fully specified.
With this iteration, anticipated problems can be found, such as the rail congestion problem
in the Tokyo area. The headway determines how much the total operating cost is and
whether further capital investment is necessary in the Tokyo area to increase railway
capacity. Therefore, such iterative analysis can tell the enterprise the maximum and
minimum headway that should be defined in the contract. If the frequency that is desired by
central and local government or another operator is higher than the track capacity, the
enterprise profit should be used for investment to increase the traffic capacity in the urban
area before distributing the profit to all stakeholders. In this way, the lean enterprise would
find other anticipated problems in the early stage and solve them in a cooperative manner.
Selection and Budget Allocation Process
After the iteration, more sophisticated contracts for the suggested new lines will be
obtained and then the government should select some or one of the most profitable and
sophisticated projects. Nowadays, the government has chosen too many new Shinkansen
lines and it should concentrate on a manageable number of construction projects to
maximize the asset utilization.
In the budget allocation process, it is necessary to obtain more money from the budget
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allocated for the road construction because of the greater economic and environmental
effect of the new railways. Since the government has huge debts, it needs to prioritize
among highly-evaluated projects in the transportation budget. For example, there was no
input from the local governments about the priority of railway, highway and airport
construction. We need to prioritize which modes of transportation should be increased
under the limited budget and if the local and central governments consider the road more
important, the new Shinkansen project should not be executed. The lean concept will allow
them to optimize the budget allocation process toward the strategic objectives and metrics
for the enterprise.
Operation & Adjustment Process
With constructive negotiation and its consequent fully specified contract, the enterprise can
enjoy a cooperative relationship, and the total railway network can be prosperous and
stable. Then, the leanness of the enterprise should be checked by continuous analysis of the
metrics. Even though the enterprise tried to obtain fully specified contract, it is still
necessary to adjust details to be equivalent. Therefore, minor adjustments to the contract
and regulations are allowed in the enterprise. However, the basic concept of lease payment
and asset transaction process should be the same and stakeholders should basically just
follow the rule of the provisions. Finally, some years after the operation, the government
should consider the next project so that the next project can utilize the data and anticipated
problems from the previous project.
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6.4. Usefulness of the Lean Enterprise Architecting Concept to
Railway Industry
The lean enterprise concept has usually been used in the manufacturing companies and
recently LAI has begun to use this concept for the airline industry in the U.S. This thesis
applied this concept first to the extension project of the high speed railways in Japan, and it
proved that the lean enterprise concept is also effective for the railway industry, which is a
service industry, not a manufacturing industry.
First, value exchange analysis is very important for development of the railway industry.
Many stakeholders are involved in the railways and each has different desired values from
the enterprise. Additionally, political intervention is higher than in other industries, since
railways have the potential to improve the local economy. Recently, in Japan, Britain, and
Germany, railways tried to limit political interventions by privatization. However, all the
railways may still need collaboration with the government, especially for further
construction, major capital investment for the maintenance and replacement, and operation
of unprofitable lines in the rural areas. The necessity of government involvement can be
understood by the fact that the present highly networked railway system could not have
been established just by private companies. Additionally, the railways need an integrated
system among many stakeholders for safe and reliable service. In this situation, the railway
industry needs collaboration, the integration and the elimination of political intervention.
Collaboration conflicts with the elimination of political interventions, but the politicians or
governments are also one of the stakeholders and the railway industry needs to consider
them as stakeholders, which means political issues cannot be completely eliminated.
Thus, the concept of lean enterprise allows us to have well-balanced relationships among
stakeholders. Equivalent value delivery and reduction of political interventions to some
extent can be obtained by the value exchange analysis as mentioned above. If all
stakeholders negotiate for the optimized value exchange under the lean enterprise concept,
the railways can satisfy all stakeholders, while some political interventions can be reduced.
Thus, in this value exchange aspect, the lean enterprise concept is appropriate to apply to
the railway industry.
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Second, if we apply the lean enterprise concept to the railway industry, collaborative
relationships can be obtained and also waste can be eliminated. The ridership and the
national expenditure for railways are decreasing, because of the trend toward the car and air
transportation. In this difficult situation, the railway industry needs to have a collaborative
relationship and eliminate waste in the entire industry to acquire the further efficiency and
obtain the power to win the competition.
Third, with the lean enterprise concept, we can easily build the strategic objectives and
metrics in a broad point of view and pursue them continuously. If there is an organization
that has certain strategic objectives and metrics, it is easy to pursue the objectives with all
stakeholders. This systematical assessment by all stakeholders allows us to assess the total
system on a long-term basis, which is very important for railway industry.
Lastly, the lean concept will tell us how the processes work and we can eliminate waste
from processes and create value added processes effectively. Also, the lean concept focuses
not only on radical change, but also on gradual change on a long-term basis. The railway
industry can not be restructured quickly because of its complexity and breadth, so the lean
concept has the potential to improve the system well.
We can conclude that the lean enterprise concept is appropriate for the railway industry.
Many stakeholders have different desired values, but need to integrate with each other.
Governmental intervention should be reduced, but the railway industry needs some
collaboration with the government. In this complicated situation, there were many
non-value-added processes in the extension project in Japan as well as much waste.
Moreover, the railway industry is shrinking because of the trend toward the other
transportation modes. The lean enterprise concept will surely help improve the complicated
situation.
128
6.5. Difficulties Executing the transition toward the Lean Enterprise
However, even if all stakeholders understand the effectiveness of the lean enterprise
concept, there is a big barrier when we actually apply the concept to the Shinkansen
extension project in Japan. The new railway extension projects have been highly connected
with politicians and it is related to the turf battles among the government divisions and
politicians: the construction itself needs a huge amount of money and the new line has the
potential to make the local economy better. In the real world, a stakeholder cares about
itself without considering the total enterprise.
For railway operators, the most important issues are profitability of the new lines and better
financial and safety situation caused by the further construction. Since the lean enterprise
delivers desired values to all stakeholders, the lean enterprise is an appropriate choice for
them to be prosperous. On the other hand, politicians pursue the political reasons, and
obtaining the budget for construction is the first priority for them. So, they tend not to
consider the operation. The government and politicians has power to change the law when
necessary and they do not need the lean enterprise concept.
In this situation, the first step toward the lean enterprise is that the government realizes the
effectiveness of the lean enterprise concept for the long-term basis for their finance and
policies, too. This may be achieved by the operators' effort to develop the lean enterprise
initiatives project first. One of the ways to introduce the lean concept, first, is to persuade
the government to integrate the data collection and analysis which was independently done
by stakeholders. Operators' proactive persuasion to the government will lead the railway
industry toward the lean enterprise.
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6.6. Summary
The Enterprise Value Stream Mapping and Analysis (EVSMA) is applied to the new
extended Shinkansen projects in Japan. Value exchange analysis is important to satisfy both
the enterprise and all stakeholders, based on how they contribute to or bear costs from each
other. Processes are optimized to increase the value-added activities and to eliminate waste,
and interactions between stakeholders are improved to meet the enterprise's needs. Finally,
the alignment of the strategic objectives, metrics, key processes, and stakeholder values are
evaluated by X-Matrix analysis for the entire enterprise to make it leaner and able to aim at
the strategic objectives better. EVSMA provides suggestions for future strategy that can
offer the projects some advantages from the lean enterprise perspective.
The results imply that the lean concept is very suitable for the development of railway
industries so as to enhance the total enterprise performance, because of the need for large
capital investment and the complexity of the relationship among stakeholders and high
technology. Systematic analyses, as in EVSMA, enable the complex enterprise to pursue
the lean ideal more easily.
However, there are some difficulties when executing the transition toward the lean
enterprise, such as the strong influence of government and political interventions. The first
step toward the lean ideal is the operators' effort to build the lean enterprise initiatives
project team at the outset in order to persuade the government and politicians to realize the
effectiveness of the lean approach. If the lean approach is applied by the representatives of
existing stakeholders, it will greatly help the gradually declining railway industry to
prosper more.
In the next chapter, the lean enterprise concept is further tested and validated through
application to Portugal's high speed rail construction project. An appropriate strategy for
construction of high speed rail, derived from this analysis, generates some implications.
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Chapter 7. Case Study of Portugal
In this chapter, the lean enterprise concept is further tested and validated through
application to Portugal's high speed rail construction project. International comparison will
be discussed (Section 7.1, Section 7.2), followed by the application of the lean enterprise
ideal to the Portuguese railways (Section 7.3).
7.1. International Comparison of Portuguese Railways
Before applying the lean enterprise concept, we need to analyze the situation in Portugal by
international comparison to define the potential opportunities of Portuguese railways. Since
Portuguese railways are in the developing stage, comparative data are important for
demand analysis and estimation what will be likely to happen in the future. The German
and Japanese railway systems are the two most advanced and most profitable
passenger-oriented railways in the world and it is worthwhile comparing them with
Portugal for assessment of the future opportunities.
Because Portugal's absolute population(Figure 7-1), area(Figure 7-2), passenger-kilometers
per year(Figure 7-3), and railway line length (Figure 7-4) are relatively small, it is
appropriate to make comparisons by using the following ratios:
* Population density [people / km2
* The length of railway line in use per capita in each country [m/people]
* The railways' ratio of passenger-kilometers per day [passenger*km/day] to railway
line in use [km], [people/day]
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Figure 7-3 Passenger-kilometers of Railway travel of Each Country in 2003
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Figure 7-4 Railway line-km used by major passenger carriers in Each Country
Population density in Portugal is as high as in France, but not as high as in Germany, U.K.
and Japan, which implies less opportunity to increase potential domestic passengers.
(Figure 7-5)
Portugal
Japan
France
Germany
UK
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
[People/km^2]
Source: Figure 7-1 and Figure 7-2
Figure 7-5 Population Density of Each Country
However, the railway line length in use [m] per capita in Portugal is not as high as in
France and Germany, but closer to that of the U.K. (Figure 7-6)
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Figure 7-6 Railway Line-m per Capita for Each Country
People in France and Germany are relatively widely distributed throughout those countries
and the railway systems broadly cover the countries' entire areas. On the other hand, most
of the people in Japan are in the urban areas and the length of railway line in use does not
have to be so long, which aids the railway's profitability. In Portugal, the length of line per
capita is the same as in U.K., is closer to that of Japan and the size of the railway system is
more manageable than in other European countries. In this case, with careful demand
analysis and concentration of construction projects, avoiding too much construction,
Portuguese railways have great potential to be successful with expanded operation of
railways.
Finally, the Portuguese railway's ratio of passenger-kilometers per day to operation length
[people/day] is almost half as high as in France and Germany (Figure 7-7). Even though
DBAG in Germany has some profit from operation, there are some subsidies for the
unprofitable lines. On the other hand, the Japanese railway system, which is one of the
most profitable passenger-oriented railways in the world, has a ratio several times higher
than those of European countries. Before initiating construction projects, the Portuguese
government therefore should not be overly optimistic about the profitability. Newly created
demand or shifts from other transportation modes such as cars and air will also be key
factors for the success of new railway lines.
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Figure 7-7 The Railways' Ratio of Passenger-kilometers per Day [passenger*km/day]
to Total National Railway Line Length [km]
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JR East
7.2. Existing Railways and New High Speed Rail Plan in Portugal
The Portuguese government is now planning to build a Lisbon - Porto domestic line and
Lisbon - Madrid international line of new HSR (High Speed Rail), as shown in Figure 7-8.
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Source: Boyana Petkova [41]
Figure 7-8 Proposed HSR links in Portugal and connections to Spain and France
The Lisbon - Porto section (336km) is the major trunk line of Portuguese railways [42]. The
frequency of fast through trains, the Alfa Pendular service, is 11 trains each way per day on
the existing conventional line, and travel time is approximately 180 minutes [43]. There is
an ongoing project for improvement in speed on the conventional line and 70 % of the line
has already been modernized [42]. The expected frequency of the new HSR is 33 trains
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each way per day and the expected travel time is 90 minutes [43], [44].
On the other hand, the Lisbon - Madrid section (453.8km) will be a major trunk railway
connection between Portugal and Spain [43]. There is only one through passenger train
service between Lisbon and Madrid, an overnight train taking approximately 10 hours [43].
The planned frequency of the new HSR is 14 each way per day and the planned travel time
will be 165 minutes [43] [44].
7.3. Applying the Lean Concept
This section shows a conceptual example of how the lean enterprise idea would be applied
to Portugal's HSR projects, and shows some of the processes to achieve the lean enterprise
ideal, based on general knowledge and data for Portuguese railways. Lack of data limits the
analysis, but finally we have general conclusions that might be developed for the HSR
projects.
7.3.1. Necessity for Lean Enterprise Concept for the HSR projects
Under the OPAT (the Accessibility and Transport Operational Program) agreement between
the Portuguese government and the EU in 2004, certain EU funds will be expected for the
project [41]. However, it seems that there is conflict among stakeholders over how to
choose and coordinate new lines. Because there are so many stakeholders involved,
equitable value exchange -a key aspect of the lean enterprise concept- is very important for
success in the project for the long term.
Additionally, the railway industry in Portugal is not profitable now, and the real
competition is with other transportation modes such as air and automobiles. In order to
maximize the performance of the projects given limited resources, total coordination and a
cooperative relationship between stakeholders are essential to eliminate waste and increase
the value-added processes.
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Also, since the project is just at the planning stage and it is almost equivalent to the
Japanese high speed rail construction projects, the lean concept is also applicable and
desirable here. For example, the strategic objectives of Japanese high speed rail
construction projects can basically be used for the Portugal's HSR project, although it
needs to be revised by the Portuguese people to adapt to the characteristics of their own
railways.
Therefore, even though it is a governmental project, it is appropriate to use the lean
enterprise concept to enhance the HSR project in Portugal.
7.3.2. Stakeholders and Value Exchange
This enterprise is an HSR project that consists of the following stakeholders:
* EU (European Union)
* Portuguese Government
* REFER (Infrastructure Company) [42]
* CP (Comboios de Portugal) or other operators like Fertagus [42]
* Freight Operator
* Spanish Government
* Manufacturing Companies
* Travelers who will use this system
* Urban Planners who considers how the project is integrated with various cities
* Construction Companies
* Laborers who will do jobs associated with the projects
* Shippers
Following is the description of some of the stakeholders as examples, and the value they
expect from the enterprise and the value contributed by each stakeholder to the enterprise,
based on references [42], [43] and the author's judgment. Further discussion and analysis in
detail for all other stakeholders is necessary for fully utilizing the lean concept ideal.
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EU (European Union)
The EU is an investor in the HSR project through the TENs (Trans-European Networks)
program budget, EU Cohesion Fund, and ERDF (European Regional Development Fund).
The budget will cover 20 % of the total cost [44]. The aim is to boost the economies of
poorer countries and better integrate them into Europe by accomplishing the following
[43]:
* The reduction of travel time in the rail network across Europe
* A shift to the railways from road and air transportation by increasing the capacity and
quality of service of railways
* Utilizing the infrastructure maximally by combining freight and passenger railways
* Expanding the use of European standard gauge, which is necessary to improve
international transportation
Portuguese Government
The government includes the INFT (Instituto Nacional do Transporte Ferroviairio, a
regulator). Their major concern is for the convenience, safety, and stability of Portugal's
transportation. They consider that the Lisbon-Porto HSR line would be valuable if the new
airport at Ota is built. Additionally, although the government was pressured by the Spanish
government to choose the routes, the Lisbon-Madrid route was finally chosen for the new
planned HSR line, because the highest demand for both passengers and freight is from
Spain [43].
The government is also concerned about the budget from the EU since the fund is the best
opportunity to develop the Portuguese railways. "The Portuguese government is expected
to suggest that the Lisbon-Porto passenger project could be mixed with freight to maximize
its profitability" to meet with an EU requirement [43].
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REFER (Infrastructure Company)
REFER will continue to invest substantially in upgrading the conventional system.
However, REFER cannot cover all the expense only from the operators' track charges now
[41]. We infer from these facts that REFER considers that the construction of the new
Lisbon-Porto HSR line may not be favorable, because of the risk associated with the
uncertainty of future demand. Upgrading the conventional line will reduce the risk of the
project, since total maintenance cost will not increase significantly. Additionally, 75 % of
the conventional Lisbon-Porto route has already been modernized [41]. REFER may need a
subsidy from the Portuguese government after the construction of the new HSR, if the total
passengers between Lisbon and Porto does not increase enough. On the other hand, for the
Lisbon-Madrid HSR line, there is no existing convenient conventional line [refer to 7.2]
and some benefits are expected from the line.
CP (Comboios de Portugal) or other operators like Fertagus
Operators are ready to run faster trains if the conventional lines are improved, but it is not
certain that they can pay enough track charge to REFER to cover the expense. Other
operators are allowed to enter the market, but we cannot anticipate that there will be new
entrants and true competition, because the market may not be profitable enough. Especially
on the Lisbon-Porto 336 km route, the present travel time is 184 minutes and the expected
time of HSR will be 90 minutes. Operators need to run trains frequently and reliably to
differentiate the new line from the conventional line enough to attract people to it and make
it profitable. They will surely insist that freight should not operate on the new HSR track
between Lisbon and Porto during hours when passenger trains run, to prevent interference
with the speed, reliability, safety, and frequency of passenger HSR.
On the other hand, regarding the international connection between Lisbon and Madrid,
these operators do not expect to run service directly to France, because of the long distance
and different gauge. Generally speaking, air transportation is better than rail when the
distance is more than 800 km. Therefore, focusing on the Madrid-Lisbon route for the HSR
project is a favorable choice for passenger railway operators.
140
Freight Operator
Between Porto and Lisbon, the freight operator is satisfied with the existing conventional
line, since most sections of the line have already been upgraded. However, if the railway
becomes too crowded, they will need the HSR to increase the overall capacity between
Lisbon and Porto. On the other hand, between Lisbon and Madrid, if they are allowed to
operate on the HSR track, it will be favorable since the travel time will decrease, but freight
operations may interfere with the HSR passenger service.
The biggest problem is the track gauge. It is not appropriate to use free gauge freight
trains 13 because of the high manufacturing and maintenance cost. If the new line is
standard gauge and freight trains operate on it, they will not be able to continue on wide
gauge tracks, such as the tracks between Madrid and the border on the route to northern
France as in Figure 7-8, for connecting to other European countries.
Spanish Government
The Spanish government is also being encouraged to invest in the HSR project in Spain
through the TENs program. The Lisbon-Badajoz-Madrid route is one of the HSR projects
in Spain. "PI 2000-2007 (Infraestructuras 2000-2007)" [45] announced that they will
construct the five new corridor lines which include the Lisbon-Badajoz-Madrid route.
Therefore, there will be no chance for the Portuguese government to choose another
connecting line between Portugal and Spain without negotiating with the government of
Spain.
For international connections to France, the Spanish government had planned to change the
gauge to the standard gauge used on its domestic TGV network, but the plan was
abandoned because of its huge cost [11]. Instead, free gauge trains are now used to solve
the gauge-difference problem, but this increases the manufacturing and maintenance cost
and is not desired by the other European railway companies. We can guess that the reason
why they decided to not make this investment was that the Spanish government gave
13 A free gauge train such as the Talys passenger trains can change their gauge to adapt to
the different gauges of rail track between France and Spain.
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priority to passenger railways inside Spain, which are short-distance and profitable for
railways. However, they may have plans to change the gauge of the track to the French
border in the future, because there is a tendency for the Spanish government to use standard
gauge for new tracks. For example, according to the PI 2000-2007, the Spanish government
is planning to build all the new lines to standard gauge so that they will be eligible to get
funds from EU as TENs projects [45].
Manufacturing Companies
The Alfa Pendular trains, made by Fiat, did not have an established record of reliable
operation, and breakdowns have caused many delays [41]. Manufacturing companies tend
to show new technology to attract orders, but the buyers may focus too much on the new
technology rather than on durability and reliability. The manufacturers are highly
dependant on the buyers' intentions.
7.3.3. Equitable Value Exchange
It is essential to have value exchange analysis and adjust the original plan to satisfy all
stakeholders based on their contribution to the enterprise. Allocation of both responsibility
and rewards should be considered in the early stages. More specific data is necessary for an
analysis in detail, but based on the information and author's judgment, I recommend the
following, from the standpoint of equitable value exchange;
Financial Value Exchange
The value exchange between stakeholders and enterprise is very important in terms of
finance. As mentioned in the Japanese case, the enterprise needs to show clearly the
amount that each stakeholder can expect to pay for the future maintenance cost and
operation cost.
From the railway companies' point of view, considering the insufficient revenue coming
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from all the track charges of existing conventional lines, REFER and CP need to have
careful demand analysis and strategy to increase the share of passengers. In the early stages,
the enterprise should recognize how much each stakeholder will be responsible for and pay
for the deficit of the operational, maintenance, and replacement costs. Since there are some
conventional lines which are parallel to the new lines and demand will be reduced by the
new lines, the cost is not only for the HSR lines but also for all the other parallel
conventional lines whose demand may be affected by the new HSR projects.
The Portuguese government will especially need to define the subsidies for the lines, given
how much it can afford, considering the public nature of railways and the environmental
and economic point of view. The railways in France and the U.K. now have large subsidies
and German railways also have some subsidies for unprofitable rural lines even though
DBAG increased profit recently. This project is driven by the Portuguese government, and
the enterprise needs to have careful unbiased risk analysis for equitable cost allocation in
the future.
Value Exchange Among Spain, Portugal, and EU
Another route, Averro-Salamanca (Figure 7-8), might be a good connection to other
European countries through France [41], and the budget from EU might be easy to acquire,
but the Porto-Madrid line was chosen partly because of the strong Spanish government
preference. The compromise between the Spanish and Portuguese governments was a good
choice for both countries. Rather than having a hostile relationship, they need to have an
effort to define a contract that delivers value to each country equitably before the
construction begins. The contracts should include both the passenger and freight railway
operations, and connection routes from Portugal to other European countries through Spain
(Figure 7-8).
From the EU point of view, if the new HSR is well connected with the airport at Ota and
with Spain, then the EU will gain some benefits from the project. However, in exchange for
the funding, EU will surely want not only the domestic Porto-Lisbon line and the
Lisbon-Madrid international line, but also the expansion of the network to reach to the
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other EU countries, in order to improve the entire EU rail network.
For Portugal, there is a potential to increase the Portuguese freight traffic to other European
countries, if the Spanish government decides to change the wide gauge track to standard
gauge between Madrid and the French border on the route to northern France, as in Figure
7-8. This would enhance the value delivery to Portugal, since it would enable freight trains
to operate directly from Portugal to other European countries. Additionally, to satisfy the
EU demand in order to get the funds, it is desirable to have good connections with other
European countries through France (as shown in Figure 7-8) in the future. It is uncertain
that the Spanish government will decide to change the track gauge of existing lines to
standard, but an enthusiastic Portuguese government push may succeed in getting the gauge
changed.
Value Exchange Between Freight and Passenger Railways on the HSR line
The track gauge for new construction should be standard gauge to satisfy the EU and
facilitate further potential extension to the French border (Figure 7-8). This selection of
standard gauge for the extension to the French border is mainly for freight railways,
because the long distance of more than 2000 km is unappealing for passenger travel but
highly advantageous for freight railways. Even in Japan whose passenger railway share is
much higher than in European countries, there is only a 10 % of rail share between air and
rail at 1000 km distance (Refer to Figure 6-32). On the other hand, freight railways are
strong when the distance is longer than approximately 1000 km. If direct freight operation
on HSR track between Madrid and Porto is allowed, the total distance is only about 800 km
[42]. Further extension is necessary for the freight railways, and the change in gauge of
tracks between Madrid and the French border with Spain is the best way to increase
revenue from freight railways and to satisfy the EU requirements.
However, the mixed operation of HSR and freight railways on the same track is a
controversial issue. If freight trains operate on the HSR track during the time that
passenger trains are running, the safety, frequency and average speed of HSR will be
greatly reduced. In Japan, freight railways are not allowed to operate on the HSR track
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because of the high demand for passenger travel and because night hours, when passenger
trains do not run, are needed to maintain track at the level necessary for smooth, safe, and
reliable HSR service. One of the most important values of the enterprise, competitiveness,
will depend a great deal on the average speed, frequency, comfort and reliability of the
HSR service. The decision whether freight railways are allowed to run on the HSR track is
very important.
In order to cope with the future passenger demand and to compete with air, the frequency
of passenger HSR and freight railways on the new HSR track should continue to be
optimized periodically before and during the operations. The optimum depends on the
passenger railway frequency, on signal constraints, and on track maintenance requirements.
Because the HSR projects highly depend on the Spanish railways policy, all possible
options for the future should be discussed with Spain in the initial stages. Otherwise, there
will be conflicts between the Spanish and Portuguese governments and the ongoing railway
projects and operations will be far from the lean enterprise ideal.
Equitable Contracts and Regulation
When the Madrid-Lisbon HSR is built, the Portuguese and Spanish railway companies will
operate on the same track, although there are different regulations in each country.
Additionally, freight railways may be operated on the same track. Equitable contracts and
regulation between freight and passenger railways and between Portuguese and Spanish
railways will be necessary to prevent conflicts.
Importance of Reliability and Durability of Rolling Stock
Because trains will usually be used more than 20 years and require technology with
long-term reliability and durability, JR East, as an operator, places great importance on
these criteria. Compared with Alfa Pendular, the Siemens rolling stock like ICE which has
demonstrated reliability and durability would have been better for achieving reliable
operation for the long term. Operators and manufacturing companies should focus on the
reliability and durability as important values.
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Recently, France has achieved the fastest train speeds in the world [46] and others are also
advancing the new technology of rolling stock. However, the maximum and average
operational speed is much lower than the testing speed and the enterprise needs to focus on
the operational speed and reliability. This is partly because the maximum and average
operation speeds highly depend on the combination of infrastructure conditions and the
characteristics of rolling stock. Additionally, rolling stock introduced for the new HSR also
needs to have a long testing time for durability and reliability. For example, JR East usually
does testing for several years.
Therefore, the value delivery in terms of the reliability and durability of rolling stock is
very important for ensuring the reliable service that attracts people, and the enterprise
should focus more on the reliability and durability of the rolling stock. This value delivery
depends highly on the operators' attitude to introducing the rolling stock in HSR.
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7.3.4. Interactions for Cooperative Relationships
A more detailed analysis would be desirable, but based on the author's judgment, the
interactions between some of the stakeholders are shown in Figure 7-9.
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Figure 7-9 Interactions between Stakeholders
To become a lean enterprise, the enterprise of the HSR project needs to have improved
performance levels for the following interactions, which are of higher importance and for
which the performance level is now judged to be low.
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Interactions between the Spanish and Portuguese Governments
The interactions between the Spanish and Portuguese governments look weak in this
project. EU funding is related to the aim of a better international network, but the total
railway coordination of Europe will first require coordination with the Spanish railways. If
the interactions between the Portuguese and Spanish governments progress in a cooperative
manner, Portuguese passenger railways will have more opportunity to increase the potential
international passenger ridership, even if there is no significant potential for increased
domestic ridership.
Additionally, freight is important for European railways, and they should determine
whether freight trains can run on the HSR line and continue to the French border by
making an early, cooperative decision about the track gauge to the French border. The
reduction of travel time of the freight rail network across Europe will be significantly
enhanced by such better interactions, while the EU will be more satisfied with the projects.
In the early stages, both the Portuguese and Spanish governments should focus more on
their relationship for both passenger and freight railway purposes.
Interactions between the Portuguese Government and Railway Companies
The Portuguese government and railway companies should have more interactions to
increase the effectiveness of the investment for the total railway system in Portugal and to
improve the relationship with the railway companies in Spain. Both rolling stock and
infrastructure need to have a common standard technology for efficient and reliable
operation.
Interactions among railway companies in Portugal and Spain
Under EU440, separation of operation and infrastructure is necessary, and both the
Portuguese and Spanish railways have satisfied the minimum requirements. Given EU 440
and this unbundled system, the integration of the total system is all the more necessary.
Also, operational integration between Portugal and Spain is important for through train
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operation between the Portuguese and Spanish railways.
Interactions among Railway Companies, Rolling Stock Manufacturing Companies,
and Infrastructure Instrument Companies
Better interactions among railway companies, rolling stock manufacturing companies, and
infrastructure-component manufacturing companies are necessary, because, except for the
railway companies of Portugal, these companies will be foreign ones with different
languages, distant headquarters, and culture differences. For example, reliable transmission
of signals between ground infrastructure and rolling stock needs coordination, and the
speed highly depends on the combination of track conditions and the characteristics of the
rolling stock. Also, the support system provided by manufacturers is critical for the
reliability of operations. Careful selection of these companies is necessary, as is
cooperation with them.
7.3.5. Process Optimization
To become a lean enterprise, all processes should be value-added and need to eliminate
waste. The suggestions below are from the author's judgment, based on the Japanese case
study.
An Initial Process to have Equitable Contracts
As a typical recommendation when introducing the lean ideal, a special committee team
that consists of all stakeholders and that worries about as enterprise-wide should be
organized first. It enables the industry to conduct equitable, unbiased data analysis and a
better decision-making process. The regulations, operational contracts and schemes for
access charges should be decided on before construction, so that, as proposed in the
Japanese case study, cooperative relationships and prevention of political intervention can
be accomplished when the construction begins. Especially, the negotiation process with the
Spanish government will be one of the earliest processes for the equitable value exchange
and cooperative relationship thereafter.
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Data Analysis Process
In the planning process, now, the Portuguese government expects higher demand after the
construction of new HSR lines. Operators and REFER should also be involved in
sensitivity analyses of the future demand and profitability of total railway systems to ensure
good decisions without any bias. Reimbursement to the Portuguese government, EU, and
others for huge replacement and future maintenance costs of total railway system, will, in
addition to construction costs, need to be covered by future operations. The project should
focus not on construction, which will be partly funded in the future by EU and the
Portuguese government, but, as much as possible, on long-term profitability.
Investigating Process
When investigating the future technology and system, the enterprise needs to refer to the
good examples of Germany and Japan, which have the most advanced technology in terms
of the precision and reliability of the railway operation.
Even though the Japanese railway system is different from European systems, Portugal can
learn from the Japanese system as Germany did. For example, to increase the acceleration,
all cars should have motors, not just cars at the ends of each train. In Japan, all HSR trains
have used this method since 1964 and recently ICE and other European railway systems
have begun to introduce this method because of the high acceleration. This allows a great
increase in the frequency of trains and reduction of the travel time. Learning from the
technology and management system from the Japanese railway system may be worthwhile
for the future reliable operation.
However, the Japanese system is so different that it is not recommended for the HSR
project in Portugal unless there is enough time for thorough testing. For example, the
Japanese signal system technology is different from the standard technology of European
countries.
Considering the similar circumstances in European countries, the German railway system
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may be the best prototype for the future HSR operation in Portugal, though it is also
worthwhile to learn from Japanese railway systems.
Testing Process for New Rolling Stock and Infrastructure Components
A long testing time is necessary for the reliability of the operation, which is very important
for the value exchange in the project. If the HSR will open within several years, rolling
stock manufacturing companies and infrastructure instrument companies should be selected
in the earlier stages, so that they can have enough testing time. For example, the stable
transmission of signals between ground infrastructure and rolling stock needs long testing.
We recommend that the enterprise should choose the combination of rolling stock and
infrastructure (such as track, electric power supply, and signals) that use established
technology to prevent future problems. Additionally, the maximum and average operation
speeds highly depend on the combination of track condition and rolling stock
characteristics. As soon as a section of the lines is constructed, the enterprise should start
testing the new rolling stock and the infrastructure.
Lower Risk Processes for Accomplishing the HSR Pro ject In Portugal
Lower risk processes of the HSR project are necessary because of the huge investment.
First, between Lisbon-Madrid, we can assume that the long travel time and extremely low
frequency inclines people to use air and cars instead of rail, and that this inconvenient
transportation also loses many potential customers. In Japan, 70% of people use the 500 km
HSR line between Tokyo and Osaka and this has proved that high reliability, frequency, and
speed with a reasonable fare can increase the railway share among modes over this distance.
Since there is no good railway connection between Lisbon and Madrid and 453.8 km is a
favorable length for a new HSR project, reliable HSR service would be likely to succeed in
changing the major mode from air to rail.
On the other hand, between Porto and Lisbon, there are fewer potential customers. In
addition to the fact that Portugal's population density is much lower than those of Japan
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and Germany, the populations of Porto and Lisbon are only 1.8 million and 2.7 million [47]
while there are 61 million people in Japan's three big metropolitan areas, Tokyo, Nagoya,
and Osaka [12]. In this case, it is very hard to anticipate a great increase in demand from
domestic sources. Also, the connection with an airport will be necessary to satisfy the EU
and the Portuguese government. However, the necessity for the new line depends on the
density of current operations. If analysis by REFER forecasts that congestion will come to
exist on the conventional line, then a new HSR line should be constructed between Lisbon
and Porto. The analysis should be discussed by all stakeholders and should suggest who
should be responsible for the demand estimation, so as to eliminate bias. On the other hand,
if congestion on the conventional line is not expected in the future, the HSR should be
considered as a possible later project after the construction of the Lisbon-Madrid HSR
route because future increased demand from Spain may change the situation. Improvement
of signals and of the condition of the existing tracks may be the low-risk way to increase
the reliability and capacity of rail under limited demand.
To sum up, it is very important to increase the international demand. Given the strong
connection with Spain for both the economy and tourism, the HSR project between Lisbon
and Madrid is a desirable one to create a new demand for railways. Therefore, the
Lisbon-Madrid HSR project should be constructed first, because there is a higher
uncertainty about increase in demand on a Lisbon-Porto HSR line. The effort to improve
the existing line between Lisbon and Porto should be done first and it may be wise to delay
the construction of a Lisbon-Porto HSR line until the enterprise can consider how the
Lisbon-Madrid HSR project affects the demand for railways and can predict additional
demand for an extension from Lisbon to Porto. Concentrating only on the Lisbon-Madrid
project will also shorten the construction time and generate the revenue to repay the
investment earlier. Thus, the Lisbon-Madrid HSR project should be accomplished first,
taking into consideration the possible future extension of direct operation from Madrid to
Porto through Lisbon.
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7.3.6. Continuous Effort toward the Lean Ideal
To approach the lean ideal, it is very important for all stakeholders to examine whether
interrelationship between key processes, stakeholder values, strategic objectives and
metrics is appropriate or not. If the analysis is done by the enterprise, it will be helpful for
better utilization of the limited resources and for improvement of coordination of railways
in Europe. To create a lean railways system, the Portuguese members should examine the
alignment of key processes, stakeholder values, strategic objectives and metrics as in the
X-Matrix analysis of the Japanese case study, after the detailed value exchange analysis
and establishment of processes.
7.3.7. Summary of the Portuguese Case Study
This chapter shows a conceptual example of how the lean enterprise idea would be applied
to Portugal's HSR projects. Lack of data limits the analysis, but finally we have general
conclusions that might be developed for the process optimization of HSR projects.
Because Portugal's high speed rail project has just begun, we highly recommend the
application of the lean enterprise concept in more detail and with more complete data. This
could be performed first by a university or another disinterested organization that has
access to the voices of stakeholders. It is best to have a joint effort with as many
stakeholders as possible. Utilizing the lean enterprise concept will allow the railway system
to make the best use of limited resources and reduce the risk of the HSR projects in
Portugal.
We emphasize that the outcomes of this chapter are based on limited sources of data and
this is a conceptual example of the application of the lean enterprise concept, which might
be useful for the HSR projects. Detailed analysis by Portuguese project members will
surely provide more valuable findings.
The next chapter offers a summary of the entire thesis and ideas for future research.
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Chapter 8. Conclusion
This thesis mainly explores and evaluates the application of the lean enterprise concept to
the expansion and development of the high speed (Shinkansen) railways in Japan. In
addition, we consider high speed rail in Portugal although not at the level of detail that we
consider in Japan. In this concluding chapter, the implications of the major findings from
the application of the lean enterprise ideal to the railway industry will be discussed (section
8.1), followed by suggestions for the next steps in the future to make that industry still
leaner (section 8.2).
8.1. Summary
The Present Situation and the Importance of the Lean Concept
The lean enterprise concept, presented in MIT classes [18], has proven useful in a
manufacturing context. The basic idea of the lean concept is to increase value-added
processes, to eliminate waste, and to create equitable value delivery throughout the
enterprise. It also focuses on both radical change and continuous gradual improvement. In
this thesis, we applied the lean enterprise concept to the high speed rail environment.
In Japan, new Shinkansen lines are being planned and constructed as a governmental
project. There are many stakeholders involved, but cooperative relationships and
integration of the project are not at the highest possible level and the project is not lean.
When the budgets are extremely limited, integrated planning by all stakeholders is
necessary to reduce risks and waste of investment. We argue and demonstrate that the lean
enterprise concept can also be useful in this context.
The major differences of the high speed rail application from the manufacturing application
is that more stakeholders are involved, more integration and collaboration is necessary for
the entire system, and more equitable value exchange is important, since the critical point
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for a reliable and safe railway system is the integration of the entire system. In the author's
judgment, there is more need for the lean ideal for the development of high speed rail
projects than in the manufacturing industry.
Portugal is also now planning to construct new high speed rail lines and it is essential to
organize the best system for these new projects. The lean enterprise concept can be further
tested and validated through application to Portugal's high speed rail construction project.
Although the data are limited, an appropriate strategy for construction of high speed rail,
derived from this analysis, still generates some clear implications. It turns out that the lean
concept is also applicable here and desirable, since the project is just at the planning stage
and it is almost equivalent to the Japanese high speed rail construction projects.
Application of the Lean Concept
The goal of this thesis is to apply the idea of the lean enterprise, which usually is associated
with manufacturing companies, to this service industry, the railway industry. This is the
first application of the lean enterprise concept to the new high speed rail construction
projects. So, this thesis has not only considered the future strategy of the newly constructed
high speed railways in Japan and Portugal, but has also assessed whether lean enterprise
architecting is applicable to the new high speed rail construction projects throughout the
railway industry.
First, to utilize the lean concept, the strategic objectives must be defined clearly so they can
be pursued by all stakeholders. Even though the strategic objectives should be determined
by the enterprise itself, it is a good start to review the history and make international
comparisons, and to seek to inductively derive the strategic objectives of the enterprise as
an academic undertaking. Accordingly, this thesis first looks back at the history of the
Japanese railway system and examines the details of the present Shinkansen railway system.
It then makes an international comparison with the United Kingdom and German railway
systems. There were reforms to improve the railways in these countries, but they have still
common serious problems: inequitable contracts and regulations, political interventions,
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and integration problems. Based on the common strategy and difficulties of the reforms in
the U.K., Germany, and Japan, the strategic objectives of the extension of the high speed
railway project in Japan were defined as the following;
(Strategic Objectives)
1: To strengthen transportation and economy in Japan, and to reduce environmental
impacts
2: To make the level of service and safety high on a long-term basis
3: To increase the competitiveness of railways in relation to other transportation modes
4: To integrate the total railway system
(Ways in which strategic objectives 1, 2, 3, and 4 can be achieved)
5 By reducing political intervention
6 : By achieving equitable contracts and regulations
These strategic objectives basically can also be used for the Portugal's HSR project, though
they need to be revised by the Portuguese people to adapt to the characteristics of their own
railways.
Then, the lean enterprise concept is applied to the new high speed rail construction projects
in Japan and Portugal. In the EVSMA (Enterprise Value Stream Mapping and Analysis),
value exchange analysis is important to satisfy both the enterprise and all stakeholders,
based on how they contribute to or bear costs from each other. Processes are optimized to
increase the value-added activities and to eliminate waste, and interactions between
stakeholders are improved to meet the enterprise's needs. Finally, the alignment of the
strategic objectives, metrics, key processes, and stakeholder values is evaluated by
X-Matrix analysis for the entire enterprise to make it leaner and able to aim at the strategic
objectives better. EVSMA provides suggestions for future strategy that can offer the
projects some advantages from the lean enterprise perspective. These are some of the most
important specific recommendations to the new high speed rail projects of Japan and
Portugal from the analysis of the lean concept in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7;
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1: Value Exchange Analysis
Equitable contracts and regulations should be settled in the early stage, after considering as
many future possibilities as possible, in order to keep the value delivery to stakeholders
equitable and to avoid possible later conflict. The lean enterprise concept will help them to
become equitable, especially through the value exchange analysis.
* In Japan, ignoring railway freight transportation is inconsistent with some of the
strategic objectives, such as strengthening of transportation and economy and
reduction of environmental impacts. Priority of operation in the Seikan Tunnel and
on conventional lines should be decided first to prevent the project's harming the
freight railways.
* In Japan, transfer of the operation of the parallel conventional lines could be replaced
by changing the most unprofitable lines to bus operation. The enterprise should
consider the well-being of the total railway system and allocate the responsibility for
these unprofitable lines accordingly.
* In Japan and Portugal, given the competition with the airline industry for the new
high speed rail lines, regulation of the operation and fares of both industries will
determine the future revenue and stability. Sensitivity analysis of future demand and
profitability is highly affected by these regulations and it should be considered in the
early stages.
* In Japan, the lease contract should be equitable, based on the value exchange analysis.
Additional charge later in the process and uncertainty of treatment of ownership of the
asset at the end of the lease term will change the value exchange balance, and it should
be settled before construction.
* In Portugal, equitable contracts and regulation between freight and passenger railways
and between Portuguese and Spanish railways will be necessary to prevent conflicts.
* In Portugal, because revenue from track charges on existing conventional lines in
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Portugal is not sufficient, REFER and CP need to have careful demand analysis and
strategy. In the early stages, the enterprise should recognize how much each
stakeholder will be responsible for and pay for the deficit of the operational,
maintenance, and replacement costs.
* In Portugal, the contracts should include both the passenger and freight railway
operations, and connection routes from Portugal to other European countries through
Spain. The enthusiastic Portuguese government push may succeed in getting the track
gauge of existing lines to the French border changed to standard gauge.
* In Portugal, new construction should be standard gauge, not just to satisfy the EU, but
also to facilitate further potential extension to the French border, mainly for freight
traffic. The decision whether freight railways are allowed to run on the HSR track
should be done in early stages and the frequency of passenger HSR and freight
railways on the new HSR track should continue to be optimized periodically before
and during the operations.
* In Portugal, the value delivery in terms of the reliability and durability of rolling stock
is very important for ensuring reliable service, and the enterprise should focus more on
the values of the stability and durability of the rolling stock.
2. Interactions Analysis
In Japan, interactions among passenger operators, local government, and central
government are especially important, but the performance level has often been low. The
interactions between the freight rail operator and the central government, between rolling
stock manufacturers should also be improved.
In Portugal, given the unbundled system and through train operation between two countries,
the integration among railway companies in Portugal and Spain is important. Second, if the
interactions between the Portuguese and Spanish governments progress in a cooperative
manner, Portuguese passenger railways will have more opportunity to increase the potential
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international passenger ridership and freight transport. Also, they should determine whether
the freight can run on the HSR line or not by solving the gauge problem of tracks to the
French border in the early stages by cooperative interaction. Finally, better interactions
among railway companies, rolling stock manufacturing companies, and infrastructure
instrument companies are necessary, because all of these except for the railway companies
will be foreign ones with different languages, distant management, and culture differences.
3: Lean Process
In Japan and Portugal, as a typical recommendation when introducing the lean ideal, it is
suggested that a special committee team concerned about issues that are enterprise-wide
should be organized to aim at the lean ideal. Then, data collection and analysis should be
done, conducted by the committee to eliminate any bias. Sensitivity analysis includes
assumptions that can be manipulated, but the lean concept decreases the bias and increases
the accuracy of the analysis.
* In Japan and Portugal, the basic planning, which includes the construction planning,
contract, and regulations, needs iteration of analysis and negotiations among
stakeholders. Through the iteration, possible problems can be anticipated and
prevented, such as the congestion of track in the Tokyo area in Japan.
* In Portugal, for development of the future technology and system, it is essential to
refer to good examples. Considering the similarity of circumstances in European
countries, the German railway system may be the best prototype for the future HSR
operation in Portugal, while it is also worthwhile to learn from Japanese railway
systems.
* In Portugal, the selection of technology in early stages is essential for reliable
operation since it needs long testing time. As soon as a section of the lines is
constructed, the enterprise should start testing the new rolling stock and the
combination of the infrastructure components.
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* In Portugal and Japan, lower risk processes of the HSR project are necessary because
of the huge investment. After establishing the fully specified contract and regulations,
the enterprise should concentrate on a manageable number of construction projects
at the same time to maximize asset utilization. For example, in Portugal, the
Lisbon-Madrid HSR project should be accomplished first, taking into consideration
the possible future extension of direct operation from Madrid to Porto through
Lisbon. At the same time, the effort to improve the conventional line between Lisbon
and Porto should be completed first, since they have already invested a great deal for
the improvement of the conventional line. Concentrating only on the Lisbon-Madrid
project will also shorten the construction time and generate the revenue to repay the
investment earlier. After getting data on how the Lisbon-Madrid HSR project affects
the demand for Portuguese railways and considering how the conventional line has
been improved, the necessity and risk of the proposed Lisbon-Porto HSR should be
discussed thoroughly. Also, the enterprise should discuss with the government the
priority of the development of railway, highway, and air transportation, since the
budget is limited.
4: Lean Process and Value Exchange
Then, following the constructive negotiation and its consequent fully specified contract, the
enterprise could begin construction and operations, based on the regulations and contract.
Adjusting the contract and regulations is allowed for equitability, but should not be major,
since major changes that might be sought by strong stakeholders such as governments
would have the potential to upset the value balance. (Japan, Portugal)
5: General Lean Concept
In Japan and Portugal, as a typical recommendation when introducing the lean ideal,
continuous effort by all stakeholders is also essential to the lean ideal. Systematic EVSMA
analysis and self-assessment should continuously be done by the enterprise to become
leaner.
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Those conclusions are based on the analysis in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. Although some of
the conclusions can also be considered as general concepts, this systematic analysis has
logical flows to the conclusions and it allows the complex enterprise to aim easily at the
lean ideal and to avoid having hostile relationships. The results imply that the lean concept
is also suitable for the development of railway industries, so as to enhance the total
enterprise performance, because of the need for large capital investment and its complexity
of the relationship among stakeholders and high technology. Systematic analyses, as in
EVSMA, enable the complex enterprise to pursue the lean ideal more easily. The key
factors in the usefulness of the lean enterprise concept for railway industries are as below:
* Value exchange analysis for equitable value delivery
* Improvement of weak interactions which are important for the enterprise
*Optimization of the alignment of strategic objectives, metrics, processes, and
stakeholders' value to pursue strategic objectives
* Increase of value-added processes and elimination of waste
Difficulties of the Lean Approach
However, there are some difficulties when executing the transition toward the lean
enterprise, such as the strong influence of government and political interventions. The first
step toward the lean ideal is the operators' effort to build the lean enterprise initiatives
project team at the outset in order to persuade the government and politicians to realize the
effectiveness of the lean approach. If this succeeds, the government could be a leader
toward the lean enterprise ideal. If the lean approach is applied by the representatives of
existing stakeholders, it will greatly help the railway industry to move toward prosperity.
To sum up, the lean concept is very suitable and desirable for the development of the high
speed railway industry as in Japan and Portugal. The concept will enhance the total
enterprise performance in a cooperative and efficient manner and enable conflicts among
stakeholders that often occur today to be prevented.
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8.2. Future Research
Suggestions for further research on the application of the lean enterprise concept to the
railway industries are provided in this section.
In this thesis, there are no interviews with any of the stakeholders, since there has been no
contact with any of the governments or even with JR East. The EVSMA from 6.2.3 to 6.2.6
is based on the judgment of the author, and the result might have been different if we had
some input from representatives of each stakeholder.
EVSMA analysis is not limited only to a university research setting, but is applicable to and
developed for the real world. For example, equitable contracts will be enhanced by the
value exchange analysis by stakeholders themselves and subsequent negotiation. EVSMA
is a better process when the input includes all stakeholders' voices. As a typical
recommendation when introducing the lean ideal, it is highly recommended that a special
committee team whose scope of concerns is enterprise-wide should be organized. So, we
strongly suggest that further research involve interviews with representatives of
stakeholders. This thesis can provide a strong basis for such interviews.
Additionally, we need to have further research to examine how effective the lean concept
and EVSMA are, if stakeholders of the new high speed rail projects do this analysis and
utilize the lean concept for future planning by themselves. As a part of the research, it
would be valuable to compare how the stakeholders' EVSMA is the same as or different
from the EVSMA produced without the input from all stakeholders' voices.
In Japan, the reform in 1987 increased the independence of each company and this turned
out to be successful for better operation of the existing lines, but the total coordination and
collaborative relationship among stakeholders was apparently reduced. The lean concept
for the further extension and development of the railway industry is especially needed to
eliminate this side-effect of the 1987 reform of Japanese railways.
We also suggest that the effectiveness and limitations of the lean concept for railway
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industries in other countries should be examined. The lean enterprise concept has won
global acclaim in manufacturing, but this thesis is the first to apply the lean concept to the
railway industry. It should be worthwhile for universities and research institutions to
examine the effectiveness and limitations of the EVSMA analysis and the lean concept as
potentially applied by the stakeholders of the new construction projects of world's railway
industries.
For the Portuguese HSR project, the analysis needs to be done in more depth by
stakeholders since we had less access to data and information. Additionally, Portugal's high
speed rail project has just begun, and we highly recommend that research in EVSMA
should be done, first, by a university or another disinterested organization that has access to
the voices of stakeholders. It is best to have a joint effort to utilize the lean enterprise
concept. In the next stage, the institution should suggest that the stakeholders themselves
establish an organization like LAI to aim for the lean enterprise ideal before the value
delivery becomes inequitable and political interventions become too strong for an
appropriate decision about future HSR projects. At this stage, the university or other
disinterested organization should also continue to be involved in the organization in order
to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the first application of the concept to the
railway industry and to ensure balanced equitability.
We hope the research is valuable to the railway people in Japan, Portugal and other
countries. It will be very interesting to apply this new idea of lean concept to existing
industries, especially for the development of high speed rail. We hope that the people will
find some values from the lean concept in their own railway industries.
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